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THE EFFECTS OF URBAN GROWTH ON THE COUNTRYSIDE

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I. AGRICULTURAL EFFICIENCY AND URBANIZATION

BEFORE cities can emerge and grow it is necessary that the agricultural system with which they are associated shall have developed powers of feeding a non-agricultural population and providing them with such agricultural raw materials as they require for clothing, shelter, and fuel. The prerequisite of each step in relative growth is a further increase in efficiency in agricultural production, with increase in output per person engaged, so that a greater non-agricultural population may be maintained. Increase in proportion of urban population is evidence of increasing efficiency of the agricultural population in the hinterlands of the cities concerned, whether these cover only the distances possible for horse and river transport as for many medieval cities, or cover an overseas empire as in the present case of Great Britain.

Increasing efficiency in agriculture and urbanization are two sides of one movement. Some countries which are approximately self-supporting in food supplies have a low proportion of urban population because their agricultural systems will not support a higher industrial and urban

proportion and a better distribution of the total population.

The development of cities may not be inevitable, but if any society is to show marked advance in material civilization it is necessary that its system of agricultural production shall develop so that ever-increasing numbers of workers may be set aside for the production of goods other than foodstuffs and primary raw materials and to render services. The less people that any society requires to maintain in agricultural production, the greater may be its supplies of clothing, furniture, housing, transport, books and papers, musical instruments, and all the other things, and the greater and more varied may be the services of the pro-

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fessions in education, entertainment, literature and art, medicine, law, and religion. Rising efficiency in agriculture causing increase in output per person engaged, increasing proportion of non-agricultural or urban population, rising material civilization, and rising culture all go together and at times more or less in that order.¹

In this country about 7 per cent. of the gainfully occupied persons supply the food equivalent of nearly half the supply for the whole population. If we had land enough, and sufficiently varied climatic conditions, about 15 per cent. of the gainfully occupied persons could feed the whole population. Indeed, it seems probable that under the agricultural conditions of the English-speaking world as a whole about 12 per cent. of the gainfully occupied could produce the food supplies for the whole population. In U.S.A., for instance, about 20 per cent. produce food supplies for their own population, very considerable amounts of agricultural raw materials in excess of domestic requirements, and some foods for export.

The principle involved can be seen quite clearly in British domestic budgets and in the national expenditure. Of the total national income available for spending and saving about 30 per cent. is spent on food. If as a rough calculation about half the cost of food to consumers is taken as costs of collection, marketing, transport, processing and manufacturing, distribution and general servicing of food supplies, this leaves 15 per cent.

as the proportion spent on primary foodstuffs.

As in the cases of primitive and advanced societies, the poor groups in the population devote high proportions of their resources to obtaining food while with each step upwards in riches less is spent on foods and more on other goods and services. The poorest groups in the population, those with less than 10s. per head a week, spend just over 50 per cent. of income on foodstuffs; the poorest working-class groups about 45 per cent., and then the proportion steadily diminishes until 10 per cent. is reached in families with incomes of £1,500 a year, and with the richest families the proportion spent on actual foodstuffs becomes very small. The national average is about 30 per cent. at retail prices and 15 per cent. or thereabouts at farm prices.

Part of the results of increasing efficiency in agriculture arising from distribution of production according to variations in primary cost is swallowed up in transport, marketing, preservation, and distribution, but as these services and their ancillaries tend to be situated in urban areas they increase urbanization. Part of the increase in output per man

¹ Agricultural efficiency with fairly high proportion of non-agriculturists is not necessary to culture in a general sense, but agricultural efficiency and some types of culture are closely associated. Agricultural efficiency is necessary to a high culture which is to cover the whole of the population.

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in agriculture arises from the association of increasing amounts of capital goods—implements, machines, power units—with the diminished numbers of workers, but as these are mostly produced in industrial areas their production again causes urbanization. Improvements in cultivation, better selection and breeding of crops and livestock, better associations between crops and soils and between animals and crops, substitution of animal for human power, then substitution of mechanical for animal power, mechanization; general improvements in organization of production in agriculture give higher outputs per man, more variety and certainty in supply, more varied occupations in the ancillary industries, and, finally, urbanization.

Thus urbanization arises on the industrial and the economic side from the pre-farm manufacture of agricultural requirements and from the post-farm transport, marketing, processing, manufacturing, servicing ¹ of food supplies, and because most if not all these processes are more economically conducted on a large than a small scale; also because of necessary concentration of population near sources of raw materials such as mines and quarries. Geographical distribution of agricultural production according to differences in costs also causes urbanization by causing collection of population at ports and other points of concentration

of goods.

If the nations which enjoy the Western type of civilization are prepared to reduce their consumption of goods other than foods, reduce employment in professions and services, and reduce the variety of human occupations, they may diminish the proportion of urban and increase the proportion of agricultural population in the total, but on the whole human life will be the poorer. All the trends of material culture—of applied science, engineering, industrial organization—with all the trends of demand amongst the great mass of consumers are in the opposite direction. All the poorer groups of the population need more of the non-agricultural products and more services, and taking the Western nations as a whole, their poorer groups cannot be satisfied without further increase in the proportion of the non-agricultural population. The "drift from the land" is both a cause and a symptom of rising material civilization. There are some suggestions that applied science, engineering, industrial organization, large-scale production in the nonagricultural industries, could now provide for all necessary increases in supplies, so that further advance in agricultural techniques, further changes in combinations of capital and labour, further improvement in the organization of production in agriculture are both unnecessary and undesirable; and occasionally there are suggestions that agriculturists

¹ E.g. banking, insurance, speculation.

should return to more primitive methods than those they now follow. Adoption of any such suggestion would require the complete social segregation of the agricultural group and the creation of a helot class of agriculturists. While occupational and residential mobility exists, while industrial transfer remains possible, the working conditions and standards of living of agriculturists must continue to approach those enjoyed by other groups. Any return to more primitive forms of division of labour, or to more primitive forms of organization, will lower the level of security and well-being of both the agricultural and the urban populations.

Agriculturists who understand the foundations of their own material welfare will not be anxious to increase the proportion of agriculturists in the total population of their market area, because that would lead to a lower output per man in agriculture, with lower average incomes, and almost certainly to a lower supply of non-agricultural goods and services

for their enjoyment.

But industrial and economic processes which in themselves are wholly desirable may create some unsatisfactory social conditions. In this case the reduction in the number of people associated with a given area of land may lead to such sparse settlement that all services become expensive in both time and money and some can be obtained only with great difficulty. The ideal condition for the agriculturist is that of organization of agricultural production for high outputs and earnings, with organization of residential settlement of families in other occupations so that supply of services becomes possible at economical charges, together with wide choice of human associations. The association of family groups required for effective social co-operation and for choice of associations may not necessarily depend on intensive agriculture and often arises from other conditions.

II. GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

A considerable proportion of human beings in every age have sought the "city" life. Using the term "city" to indicate the concentrated human settlement which is separated from its agricultural hinterland first by a wall of dirt or stone, and then by walls of distance and by social and psychological differences, the city life has been held to be desirable in practically every age in which it has been possible. Practically all the people who praised the rustic and his life, as in "Georgics" and pastorals, were careful to maintain their hold on positions in the city. Men sought the city for physical and for psychological safety, for its relative freedom, for the greater number and variety of human associations which it offered, and then for the greater variety of human occupation and for the greater economic opportunities which arose in this larger

social group. Then the cities became the safe storehouses of movable wealth, the centres of coining and of monetary transactions, seats of political administration and justice, centres of religious organization and administration, and centres of large-scale industry and commerce. At the latest stage they become the centres of the most abstract economic services, banking, insurance, speculation, and "paper marketing," and the centres of mass production of news, propaganda, and entertainment. But as the cities developed and became more numerous they showed a great deal of differentiation, and their influences on the countryside vary to a considerable extent with the characteristics of the different types.

In considering relations between town and country we are always concerned with:

- (1) Inflow and outflow of goods,
- (2) Inflow and outflow of services,
- (3) Inflow and outflow of persons,
- (4) Inflow and outflow of knowledge and ideas,
- (5) The means of transport and communication by which these interchanges occur.

The types and the extents of the interchange depend on (a) the type of the urban centre, (b) the type of the rural population, (c) the means of transport and communication and their distance ranges, (d) the general stage of civilization and of material wealth reached in common by the urban and the rural group, (e) the existence of acute differences between the two communities in some parts of their civilization and culture.

No adequate attempt at analysis of the different types of towns and of their relations with rural groups is now possible, but as there is danger in thinking of the "town" or "city" as one thing and "the countryside" as another, without distinguishing differences within each category, it is necessary to indicate a few conditions. While the inflow of goods from country to town will depend on the geographical distribution of production, on means of transport and preservation, on the influence of purchasing power of urban groups on variety in dietaries and variety of manufactures based on agricultural raw materials which are consumed, the "mining-camp" or "single-industry" town will show great differences from a "residential" town or a "resort" and from a metropolitan city. The mining-camp or single-industry town, because of failure to retain even its own richer families, and often because of low average income, will show a high proportion of necessaries and a low proportion of luxuries in its intake. On the other hand, the residential or resort town, and some centres combining ecclesiastical, educational, and administrative concentrations with residential characteristics will show considerable proportions of luxuries and "exotics" in their intakes.

The metropolitan cities by virtue of the size and mixtures of population, and the attraction of the richest families for their purposes of ostentation and display, make the great markets for luxuries and "exotics." Some large provincial towns with mixed industries, still retaining commercial connexions with good agricultural areas, will show a high proportion of purchases of local products and often preferences for these which have favourable influences on local prices. Secondary necessaries, luxuries, even "exotics" penetrate everywhere, but their importance varies from one town to another according to the distribution of the richer and the poorer groups, and according to the effects of influences which tend either to the retention or to the breaking down of previously fixed habits of consumption.

The types and proportions of goods which rural populations take from towns depend on the purchasing power of the rural group themselves, local means of transport, frequency of local movement of persons, degree of fixity or adaptability of habit. The general principle is that the more necessary any type of article, the more frequent its purchase, the shorter the distance between the consumer and immediate source of supply, and the nearer an article approaches a pure luxury or display character, the less frequent its purchase, the further will the consumer travel to get it. Or the greater the cash value of the purchase the longer the distance of travel for consumers' goods. For articles which have mainly a differentiating function, or a display value, the consumer often wishes to travel as far as his means will allow.

Although it is not possible to put exact distance values on these differences the following figures illustrate the position:

| Com | modit | y. | | | Source. | Common Distance (Miles) up to- |
|--|-------|-------|-----|-----|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Sweets, Tobacco Food necessaries: Bro | ead, | meat, | com | non | Village, small town . | 3 |
| groceries . | | | | | Village, small town . | 8 |
| Household equipm | ent | | | | Small town | 10 |
| | | | | | Large town | 30 |
| Working clothes | | | | | Small town | 10 |
| Children's clothes | | | | | Large town | 10-30 |
| Better clothing | | | | | Larger town if possible . | 15-30 |
| Display clothing | | | | | Provincial centre, regional | |
| | | | | | metropolis | 50-100 |
| Jewellery: Cheap | | | | | Small town | 10 |
| Expensive . | | | | | Large town, metropolis . | 150 |
| Cheap furniture | | | | | Small town | 15 |
| | | | | | Large town | 50 |
| Better furniture | | | | | Larger town or provincial | - |
| | | | | | centre | 50-100 |

The small market town will be the source of many common necessaries for most of the families in its area, and the source of their highest luxuries for the poorest families. As regards other traffic, it may be the centre for minor administrative activities—the Rural District Council, the Petty Sessional Court; it may be a centre of higher education of the central or secondary school type, it will provide the lower-grade services in law, medicine, and dentistry, and the lowest grades of commercial entertainment. More particularly in the case of some of the nonconformist churches the small town may be a centre of religious organization and leadership. It may be a centre of culture, with choral, debating, or adult educational activities. But it will not develop any tensions between its population and that of the rural area; in some cases the small town shows considerable apprehension of anything which might cause tension, and not infrequently is socially more conservative than the neighbouring villages. On the other hand, the mining or other single-industry town quite frequently develops tensions between its population and that of its rural neighbourhood. This type of town is generally unattractive, it is often a poor shopping centre (except for primary necessaries for which it may be very good), its dominating group of population has little or no sense of dependence on the countryside, there is conflict of social attitudes and values between the urban and rural groups, and not infrequently there is minor trouble between miners and farmers regarding various forms of trespass. This type of area, developing as an Urban District, often ran into conflict with agricultural or rural groups in the matter of rates for water supplies, sewerage systems, etc. Recent changes in rating law have eased the situation to a considerable extent, but conflicts still arise. There are many cases of development of quarries and small factories without tensions and to the mutual advantage and satisfaction of agricultural and industrial groups, especially where the development does not urbanize the district and where it leaves the previous rural groups dominant in the whole.

With the coming of the motor-car and the motor omnibus the "county town" has developed its connexions with its county area and extended its general influences, while recent developments in local government and administration, e.g. as regards roads and poor relief, raise its importance while tending to diminish that of the smaller market town. Alongside these movements there has been a marked development of "county patriotism." The county town is generally a centre of culture—it provides educational leadership, it houses the county library, and possibly a museum, it is the centre of organization for specifically agricultural or rural associations—e.g. the Women's Institute, the Farmers' Union, the Agricultural Workers' Union, the Agricultural Association, and may be

the centre for sports organization, such as the local football league to which village teams belong. Adult education may develop special facilities, and when a county has a Rural Community Council this will organize and co-ordinate many activities in adult education, recreation, and social amelioration. The county town will be the seat of justice at several of its levels—Petty Sessions, County Court, Quarter Sessions, possibly Assizes. It will provide two or three good cinemas, and may provide a theatre. It will almost certainly develop some special functions in religious leadership and organization. The general tendencies in county towns seem to be towards harmonious development between them and their various institutions and the groups and institutions of their counties. Many people may deplore the poverty of leadership which emanates from some county towns and county councils, and justly so, but to do this is to recognize their contemporary importance.

The relations between other types of towns with up to, say, 50,000 inhabitants and their rural neighbourhoods depend mostly on individual sets of circumstances. Some develop few connexions besides those of a commercial character, while others develop almost as varied a set of connexions as a county town, except for the administrative activities of the county council. The health resorts and school centres tend to have little influence on their neighbourhoods except that they create demands for domestic servants, jobbing gardeners, and other types of relatively low-wage labour. They are apt to show sensitiveness to social distinctions and their cultural activities and influences tend to be confined within their own borders. They usually provide good shopping facilities, more particularly for secondary necessaries and the simpler luxuries, and they provide commercial entertainment.

Some towns which have developed from the position of local market towns to that of manufacturing centres have retained and even developed their connexions with their countryside neighbourhoods, while other manufacturing towns, although having mixed industries, tend towards the mining-camp types of relationships with their rural neighbours. But here is a whole field of social phenomena of which there has been very

little systematic record or analysis in this country.

It remains to say that the provincial centres and metropolitan cities are the seats of higher education, of the higher justice and administration; they are the originators and the suppliers of the most expensive entertainment, the centres of the coteries of the arts, and the sources of the most lavish and noisy propaganda—commercial, political, social, and even religious.

The connexions between any given rural family and these types of towns and their institutions will depend on many conditions—on the

familial relations maintained with migrants or their descendants, on its income, its degree of isolation as regards roads and local communities, its standards of formal education, its religious and political associations, with the types and the sources of satisfactions. Low degrees of literacy and the use of dialect forms of speech used to impose considerable barriers to some cultural transmissions, but universal elementary education up to 14 and 15 years of age, distribution of cheap newspapers, and broadcasting have caused a revolution. There do not appear to be many families which are not now open in some degree to the receipt of "red-hot" news and propaganda, or open to the receipt of the more superficial of current ideas. But rural families are still highly selective in their immediate acceptance of news, views, attitudes, and values. At all points at which neighbours can watch them, they have to wait until the community is ready to move before they make important changes or, alternatively, they have to set up associations of the character of mutual support with individuals or families outside their immediate communities.

Here again we are dealing with a complex set of social phenomena and nothing more than illustration is possible. But some ideas can be transferred direct from the metropolis to the rural family by broadcasting, by the daily newspapers, by family visitors. Other ideas or attitudes come via the county town and one of its institutions, through a more local branch, to the rural family. Others travel via a national federation, county federation, a local branch, of some voluntary association to which a member of the family belongs. The meetings of voluntary associations, occupational, recreational (sports, hobbies, etc.), cultural, political, religious, of which there is a host in nearly all rural communities, provide testing grounds for ideas, attitudes, and values. There is also a trickle, sometimes a stream, of ideas from rural communities, or rural branches of associations, to their centres. When the simpler virtues or the simpler principles of social action are important in any public issue rural communities may still be capable of leading the nation and not by any means always with a conservative tendency.

There are many people who say that the rural population is losing its special characteristics, and losing its peculiar moral, social, and political virtues. But rather it should be said that urban and rural populations are absorbing the elements of a common material civilization and of a common culture. Neither the civilization nor the culture was entirely urban in origin and not all changes begin in towns. The primary changes were agricultural, and these are still important. The rural population slowly absorbs ideas and adopts modes and conditions of working, and modes and standards of living, the possibilities of which emerge from the common civilization and culture but which are often manifested first

in urban environments of one type or another. There is some lag between urban and rural changes, but such lag generally is diminishing and in some cases rural change is very rapid.

This absorption of the common elements of civilization and culture is desirable, and in this country is inevitable. It would be impossible to have two populations with radically different standards, different sets of attitudes and values, while to-and-fro travel is as easy as it is at present, while broadcasting and newspapers present standard sets of news and views, and while industrial transfer and residential migration are unrestricted except by the personal equipments of individuals and variations in their economic resources.

Relations between town and country are taking new forms with the shifts or scatter of industries and development of transport. In the areas of Coventry, Rugby, Oxford, Bedford, Luton, and other towns, people who are "country-bred" go to work in factories, industrial works, or towns and retain their rural residence with material and personal interests in the village. It is said that this is not personally detrimental to adults, but that adolescents lose touch with the better elements of rural culture and make contacts with only the cheaper and less satisfactory elements of urban culture. To-and-from movement between town and country is always selective. On (livestock) market days men will be in a majority, women in a minority, and adolescents will be very few. But on Friday and Saturday nights women will be a majority, adolescents will be numerous, and married men will be few. It is always easy to make contacts with the shops, with cinemas, or other places of entertainment, with the cheaper restaurants, and especially the fried-fish shops, and the milk and coffee bars, according to the free purchasing power held by the individual. The tracks to the trade union branch, the lodge of the friendly society, to the public library, to the social gathering of the church or chapel, and to cultural institutions generally are not so obvious and need finding. The track to the newsvendors, however, is as easy and seems to be relatively as much used as that to any other shop, and the track to the bookshop is known to many rural families.1

There is no doubt that some looseness of conduct is to be seen amongst adolescents who leave their villages for towns, whether daily for work, or weekly for shopping and pleasure, but it is far more a looseness of manners than of morals. It is exuberance of freedom: but the freedom itself is necessary to the development of the individual, to his comfortable initiation into the common culture; and it is extremely important to realize that this freedom is the condition of continued residence in the

¹ The quality of one or more bookshops in each of many small towns would surprise those who are not acquainted with them.

countryside. Denial of it would lead to migration and urban settlement. Moreover, it appears that loose language and conduct are only phases of change and development, and amongst the most staid of village residents are some of those who spend five and a half days a week in town.

But probably most people will expect to find influences of urban growth on rural society chiefly in some influences on the type and quality of the rural population.

III. RURAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

Ever since city development began there has been migration from country to town, from agriculture to other occupations. All industrial transfers and all migrations of individuals or single families are in some degree selective. It is not unlikely that the greatest "drain" on the rural population occurred when the total population was about stable in numbers, when city populations tended to increase, before the great advances in agriculture and in sanitation and medicine began in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is possible that the towns and cities did then tend to "use up" the rural population. But every healthy rural society has tended to produce a surplus of population (greater number of children than are required for its own maintenance), and nearly every progressive agricultural population has tended to create one surplus by breeding and rearing and another by adopting methods of production which increase output per person and thus reduce the number of agriculturists required to feed any given number of total consumers.1

As regards the breeding and rearing it is now necessary to realize that the general differences between effective birth-rates in urban and rural areas are diminishing, and that there are rural areas which have lower effective birth-rates than some urban areas. There are rural districts which do not show any natural increase in population. If urban populations are to be maintained in future it seems probable that they must maintain themselves or that, alternatively, they can only be maintained in so far as the industrially created agricultural and rural surplus may be sufficient for that purpose, for very little rural surplus will be created by breeding and rearing.

Birth and survival rates per 100 married couples are higher in the country than in the town, but because of the more favourable age-levels in the towns they show rates of natural increase about the same as those prevailing in the country. County boroughs show about the same, other

¹ There are some cases of common, possibly universal, family limitation in peasant communities.

urban districts lower, while Greater London shows slightly higher rates of natural increase than the aggregate of rural districts (Table 1).

The general rural population can go on maintaining itself in about the proportion of 20 per cent. of the total as in recent years, and can go on increasing at about the same rate as the urban and total populations.

There is, however, the very interesting situation that in England and Wales both Greater London and the rural districts recently have been gaining by migration: London at the expense of other counties and other internal urban areas, and the rural districts from county boroughs and probably somewhat from other urban districts (Table 2).

There are also the other peculiar and interesting situations that Wales is losing population, mostly from its urban areas, but that the rural population is also declining in some areas because of a very low rate of natural increase and higher rates of migration. Dividing Wales into two areas (1) the industrial area of South Wales—the counties of Brecon, Carmarthen, Glamorgan, and Monmouth, and (2) the more agricultural remainder of the country, the less densely populated nine counties, the following estimates of recent changes indicate the positions (Table 3).

TABLE 1
Changes in Birth-rates and Death-rates in Different Types of Areas, 1921-37

| | | | | | Crude Birth- rate per 1,000 Population. | Crude Death- rate per 1,000 Population. | Death-rate under 1 Year of Age per 1,000 Births. | Natural Increase per 1,000 Population |
|----------------|---------|--------|-------|------|---|---|---|--|
| All Areas, Er | gland | and W | ales: | | | | | |
| 1921 | | | | | 22.4 | 12-1 | 83 | 10.3 |
| 1930 | | | | | 16.3 | 11.4 | 60 | 4.9 |
| 1931 | | | | | 15.8 | 12.3 | 66 | 3.2 |
| 1932 | | | | | 15.3 | 12.0 | 65 | 3.3 |
| 1933 | | | | | 14.4 | 12.3 | 64 | 2.1 |
| 1934 | | | | | 14.8 | 11.8 | 59 | 3.0 |
| 1935 | | | | | 14.7 | 11.7 | 57 | 3.0 |
| 1936 | | | | | 14.8 | 12.1 | 59 | 2.7 |
| 1937 | | • | | | 14.9 | 12.4 | 58 | 2.5 |
| Rural District | ts, Eng | land a | nd Wa | les: | | | | |
| 1921 | | | | | 21.4 | 11.6 | 70 | 9.8 |
| 1930 | | | | | 16.2 | 11.2 | | 5.0 |
| 1931 | | | | | 15.8 | 12.1 | 53 58 | 3.7 |
| 1932 | | | | | 15.4 | 12.0 | 58 | 3.4 |
| 1933 | | | | | 14.7 | 12.1 | 56 | 2.6 |
| 1934 | | | | | 15.0 | 11.8 | 53 | 3.3 |
| 1935 | | | | | 14.8 | 11.8 | 49 | 3.0 |
| 1936 | | | | | 14.8 | 12.2 | 53 | 2.6 |
| 1937 | | | | | 14.8 | 12.4 | 50 | 2.4 |

County boroughs and other urban districts.

TABLE 1-continued

| | | | | | Crude Birth- rate per 1,000 Population. | Crude Death- rate per 1,000 Population. | Death-rate under r Year of Age per 1,000 Births. | Natural Increase per 1,000 Population |
|--|---------|-------|------|-----|---|---|---|--|
| County Bo Wales: | roughs, | Eng | land | and | | | | |
| 1921 | | | | | 23.5 | 12.7 | 92 | 10.8 |
| 1930 | | | | | 17.0 | 12.0 | 68 | 5.0 |
| 1931 | | | | | 16.5 | 13.1 | 77 | 3.4 |
| 1932 | | | | | 16.0 | 12.5 | 75 | 3.2 |
| 1933 | | | | | 15.0 | 13.1 | 75 66 | 1.9 |
| 1934 | | | | | 15.5 | 12.3 | | 3.3 |
| 1935 | | | | | 15.4 | 12.5 | 66 | 2.9 |
| 1936 | | | | | 15.5 | 12.8 | 66 | 2.7 |
| 1937 | | | | | 15.5 | 13.1 | 66 | 2.4 |
| Other Urbas Wales: | Distric | ts, E | | | | | 81 | 10.4 |
| 1921 | | | • | | 22.1 | 11.7 | 56 | |
| 1930 | * | | • | • | 15.8 | 11-1 | 65 | 4.7 |
| 1931 | | | | | 15.5 | | | |
| | | | | | | 12.4 | | 3.1 |
| 1932 | | | | | 15.0 | 12.1 | 63 | 3.9 |
| 1933 | | | | | 15·0 14·1 | 12.1 | 63 62 | 2.9 |
| 1933 | | | : | | 15·0 14·1 14·5 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 | 63 62 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 |
| 1933 1934 1935 | | ٠ | : | | 15.0 14.1 14.5 14.5 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 | 63 62 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 | : | | : | : | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 | 63 62 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 |
| 1933 1934 1935 | | | : | | 15.0 14.1 14.5 14.5 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 | 63 62 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 | : | | : | : | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 | 63 62 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 | : | | : | : | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 14·8 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 | 63 62 55 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Greater Lond | | | : | : | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 14·8 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 12·2 12·6 | 63 62 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 2·2 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Greater Lond | | | : | | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 14·8 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 12·2 12·6 | 63 62 55 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 2·2 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Greater Lond 1931 1932 | lon: | | : | | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 14·8 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 12·2 12·6 | 63 62 55 55 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 2·2 3·9 3·5 2·3 2·9 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Greater Lond 1931 1932 1933 | lon: | | | | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 14·8 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 12·2 12·6 | 63 62 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 2·2 3·9 3·5 2·3 |
| 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Greater Lond 1931 1932 1933 | lon: | | | | 15·0 14·1 14·5 14·5 14·6 14·8 | 12·1 12·4 11·8 11·9 12·2 12·6 | 63 62 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | 2·9 1·7 2·7 2·6 2·4 2·2 3·9 3·5 2·3 2·9 |

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From Registrar-General's Statistical Review. I have added the figures for crude natural increase since 1933 in order to complete the series.—Author.

TABLE 2

Estimated Increase or Decrease in Population (per cent.) Census of 1931 to Mid-year of Specified Years

Total Increase or Decrease

| | | 1934. | 1935. | 1936. | 1937. |
|-----------------------|--|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| England and Wales . | | 1.20 | 1.73 | 2.22 | 2.70 |
| Rural Districts . | | 2.84 | 3.35 | 3.38 | 4.10 |
| County Boroughs . | | 0.11 | 0.03 | - 0.14 | - 0.30 |
| Other Urban Districts | | 1.01 | 1.70 | 2.66 | 3.26 |
| Greater London . | | 2.13 | 3.02 | 4.25 | 5.21 |

TABLE 2—continued Increase by Births and Deaths

| | | 1934. | 1935. | 1936. | 8937. |
|-----------------------|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| England and Wales . | . | 0.91 | 1.23 | 1.50 | 1.76 |
| Rural Districts . | | 1.06 | 1.42 | 1.70 | 2:00 |
| County Boroughs . | | 0.93 | 1.25 | 1:51 | 1.75 |
| Other Urban Districts | | 0.77 | 1.04 | 1.27 | 1.48 |
| Greater London . | | 0.95 | 1.32 | 1.64 | 1.97 |

Increase or Decrease by Migration

| | | 1934. | 1935. | 1936. | 1937. |
|-----------------------|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| England and Wales . | | 0.38 | 0.50 | 0.72 | 0-94 |
| Rural Districts . | | 1.78 | 1.93 | 1.68 | 2.10 |
| County Boroughs . | | - o·82 | - 1.22 | - 1.65 | - 1.95 |
| Other Urban Districts | | 0.34 | 0.66 | 1.39 | 1.78 |
| Greater London . | | 1.18 | 1.70 | 2.61 | 3.24 |

From Registrar-General's Statistical Review (Annual).

TABLE 3

Estimated Increase or Decrease of Population (per cent.) Census of 1931 to Mid-year 1937

| | | | By Births and Deaths. Increase per cent. | By Migration. Decrease per cent. | Total Decrease per cent. |
|--|------|---|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Wales I: More industrial Wales II: More agricultur Wales (Total) | al . | : | 2·18 0·18 1·64 | 7·72 1·25 5·99 | 5°54 1°07 4°35 |
| England and Wales . | | | Increase. | Increase. 0.94 | Increase. 2.70 |

Migration has necessarily been selective as regards age and sex, for mobility varies with age and responsibilities, with enterprise and available resources, with limitation of opportunities of gainful occupation at the source and occurrence of opportunities of gainful occupation elsewhere, and other conditions. Between 1871 and 1911, and particularly in the early part of this century, migration tended to leave the rural population with relatively high proportions of males, with excesses of children and old people, with a "weak middle" or a low proportion of persons between 20 and 40 or 20 and 50 years of age. These conditions

tended to be specially marked in districts from which at times migration was abnormally heavy.1

While the proportion of females in the general population has been rising the ratio of females to males has risen faster in the urban than in the rural population. Part of the excess of urban females is due to greater migration of females than males from rural areas (Table 4).

With a rise in the general age-level of the population, a higher expectation of life, and changes in the birth-rates, the proportion of persons 20-39 years of age has risen in the general population, but has shown the greatest rise in the rural groups, especially of males (Table 5).

Differences of age and sex between the total rural and total urban populations are now slight. The rural population has a closer balance of males and females, but still has lower proportions of persons at the best physical ages and slightly higher proportions of old people (Tables 6, 7, and 8).

TABLE 4
Females per 1,000 Males

| | | Rural. | Urban |
|--------|---|--------|-------|
| 1881 . | | 998 | 1,083 |
| 1891 . | . | 1,008 | 1,087 |
| 1901 . | . | 1,011 | 1,086 |
| 1911. | | 1,001 | 1,087 |
| 1921 . | | 1,026 | 1,115 |
| 1931 . | | 1,016 | 1,106 |

TABLE 5
AGE-GROUP 20-39 YEARS

| | | Per 1,00 | oo Males. | Per 1,000 Females. | | |
|------|--|------------|-----------|--------------------|--------|--|
| | | Rural. | Urban. | Rural. | Urban. | |
| 1881 | | 256 | 308 | 269 | 315 | |
| 1681 | | 256 267 | 312 | 274 | 321 | |
| 1901 | | 280 | 329 | 290 | 340 | |
| 1911 | | 295 | 329 | 300 | 339 | |
| 1921 | | 295 280 | 299 | 294 | 324 | |
| 1931 | | 301 | 320 | 299 | 325 | |

¹ See Lennard, English Agricultural Wages, Macmillan, London, 1914, various sections on rural migration.

TABLE 6
SEX DISTRIBUTION

| | | Males, per o | cent. Total. | Females, per cent. Total. | | |
|------|--|--------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------|--|
| | | Urban. | Rural. | Urban, | Rural. | |
| 1921 | | 47.2 | 49.3 | 52.8 | 50.7 | |
| 1931 | | 47.5 | 49·6 | 52.5 | 50.4 | |

TABLE 7
Age-distribution, Males and Females
Per cent. of Various Age-groups

| | | 193 | 11. | 1931. | | |
|-------|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| | | Urban. | Rural. | Urban. | Rural. | |
| 0-4 | | 8.7 | 8.9 | 7.4 | 7.8 | |
| 5-19 | | 28.1 | 28.2 | 24.9 | 25.2 | |
| 20-49 | | 44.8 | 41.5 | 45'4 | 42.8 | |
| 50-59 | | 9.6 | 10.1 | 11.1 | 11.1 | |
| 60- | | 8.8 | 11.3 | 11.2 | 13.1 | |

TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OF VARIOUS AGES—ENGLAND AND WALES

| | | | Mal | es. | | | Fem | ales. | |
|---------------|------|------------|------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| | Age. | 1921. | | 19 | 31. | 1921. | | 19 | 31. |
| | - | Urban. | Rural. | Urban. | Rural. | Urban. | Rural. | Urban. | Rural |
| 0-4 | | 4.4 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 3.8 |
| 5-15 | ٠ | 10.4 | 10.7 | - | - | 10.4 | 10.3 | _ | - |
| 5-14 16-19 | | 0 | _ | 8.2 | 8.6 | - | | 8.0 | 8-3 |
| 15-19 | | 3.2 | 3.9 | - | - | 3.8 | 3.3 | | 9:6 |
| .3 .9 | • | | | 4.3 | 4.4 | | _ | 4.4 | 3.5 |
| 5-19 | | 13.9 | 14.6 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 14.2 | 13.6 | 12.4 | 12.2 |
| 20-29 | | 7.4 | 7:3 | 8-4 | 8.2 | 0.1 | 7.7 | 0.1 | 7: |
| 30-39 | | 7·4 6·8 | 7·3 6·5 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 8.1 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 6. |
| 40-49 | | 6·3 4·6 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 6-1 | 7.1 | 6.5 | 7.1 | 6-7 |
| 50-59 | | | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 5.3 |
| 50-69 | | 2.6 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 4 |
| 70 | • | 1.5 | 5.0 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| | | 47.2 | 49.3 | 47.5 | 49.6 | 52.8 | 50.7 | 52.5 | 50-4 |

It appears that general changes in respect of birth-rates and death-rates which are occurring in the general population, together with development of transport and some slight rural trend of population will eventually remove these differences between the rural and urban populations.

Agriculture as an industry has suffered the effects of selective migration, particularly as regards the "weak middle" or the relatively small proportion of workers at the age of highest physical capacity. The following figures show comparative conditions for agriculture and some other industries in 1921 and 1931, with the "weak middle" still marked (Table 9).

Social changes, like raising the school-leaving age, general changes in birth-rates, and rise in the general age-level of the population affect comparisons, but there has been a little improvement in the age constitution

of the agricultural group of employees 1 (Table 10).

Since 1931 there appear to have been considerable changes, and in particular both a loss of and failure to recruit workers under 20 years of age, so that the next census will almost certainly show a low proportion in this group, with consequent higher proportions in the groups of older workers. But this change is due to general social causes—partly to decline in the rural and agricultural birth-rates in the post-war period, partly to longer schooling, and partly to development of local transport, and to some agricultural conditions. Agriculture now has less use than formerly for unskilled and inexperienced boys and youths. But it appears that there may be problems of methods of recruitment of labour for the industry in the near future, unless the general class of employees is to show further decrease.

IV. MIGRATION AND QUALITY OF RURAL POPULATION

On the general question of the physical and mental qualities of the rural population there has long been acute conflict of ideas and opinions. On one hand, there are suggestions that it has deteriorated, that it is "a residuum," that it is a "skim-milk" group from which the "cream" has been taken; and on the other hand, there are suggestions that the rural population is a reservoir of all the virtues, biological, moral, social, and political, and that it does and must provide for the constant regeneration of a decadent urban population.

I have written elsewhere, and must repeat the statement:

"The real evidence" on physical condition of the rural population is scattered, vague, and sometimes conflicting. Apart from a few districts where the population is particularly sparse and isolated, there is no evidence to the effect that the physical quality of the

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¹ This provides the best comparison, for there are special determining factors in the case of particular groups, like farmers and shepherds.

population, as regards inherited and inheritable factors, is any higher or lower than that of the urban."

Indeed, such a large part of the urban is biologically so near to the rural—one, two, or at most three generations—it would be surprising if there were any marked difference.

TABLE 9
THE DISTRIBUTION OF AGE-GROUPS (MALES)
1921 Centur

| | | | | 1921 Cens | AT. | | |
|------------|----|-------------------------------|-------|--|--|--------------------------------|--|
| Ages. | | All Occupied Males. Per cent. | | All Engaged in Agriculture, Per cent. | Mining and Quarrying. Per cent. | Metal Workers, Per cent. | Transport and Com- munication Per cent. |
| 12-19 . | | | 14.9 | 16.8 | 18-0 | 17.7 | 17.8 |
| 20-24 . | | | 11.6 | 9.7 | 13.7 | 13.6 | 11.6 |
| 25-34 . | | | 21.2 | 16.4 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 22.0 |
| 35-44 · | * | | 20.2 | 16.8 | 19.4 | 19.5 | 20.7 |
| 45-54 . | | | 17.0 | 17.0 | 15.2 | 14.9 | 16-4 |
| 55-64 . | | | 10.4 | 13.9 | 8.0 | 8.2 | 8.7 |
| 65 and ove | r. | | 4.7 | 9.4 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| Total | | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100-0 |
| | | | | Summary | | | |
| 12-19 . | | | 14.9 | 16.8 | 18.0 | 17.7 | 17.8 |
| 20-54 | | | 70.0 | 59.9 | 71.3 | 71.0 | 70.7 |
| 55 and ove | r. | | 15.1 | 23.3 | 10.7 | 11.3 | 11.2 |
| Total | * | | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

TORY Centus

| | _ | | | 1931 Cens | us | | | |
|---|---------|---|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| Ages. | | | All Occupied Males. Per cent. | All Engaged in Agriculture. Per cent. | Mining and Quarrying. Per cent. | Metal Workers. Per cent. | Transport and Com- munication. Fer cent. | |
| 14-20 . 21-24 . 25-34 . 35-44 . 45-54 . 55-64 . 65 and over | | : | 15·1 10·0 22·8 18·6 16·8 12·1 4·6 | 15·4 8·7 18·7 15·8 16·3 15·1 10·0 | 15·1 10·0 24·6 19·3 16·4 11·8 2·8 | 16·5 9·9 24·1 19·2 16·3 10·8 3·2 | 17·1 8·4 25·6 20·1 16·3 10·2 2·3 | |
| | | | | Summary | | | | |
| 14-20 . 21-54 . 55 and over | | | 15·1 68·2 16·7 | 15·4 59·5 25·1 | 15·1 70·3 14·6 | 16·5 69·5 14·0 | 70·4 12·5 | |
| Total | . 100.0 | | 100-0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | | |

TABLE 10
Age-distribution of Male Employees in Agriculture, 1891-1931

| Age. | | | 1891. Per cent. | Per cent. | Per cent. | Per cent. | Per cent. |
|----------|--|--|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Under 20 | | | 27.3 | 23.9 | 22.0 | 21.9 | 21.0 |
| 20-44 | | | 42.0 | 44.0 | 44.7 | 43.4 | 45.0 |
| 45-54 | | | 13.1 | 13.0 | 14.1 | 14.9 | 13.7 |
| 55-64 | | | 10.3 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 12.2 | 12.4 |
| Over 65 | | | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 7.9 |
| | | | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

"There are differences in health and in mortality rates at different age-levels and under varying circumstances, between the rural and urban populations; but there is nothing to indicate that as a whole the rural is more or less healthy than the urban. Sometimes the advantages lie on one side, and sometimes on the other. Information on purely local conditions, or conditions prevailing at certain age-levels, or in particular environments, may be of great importance from the point of view of arranging preventive or remedial measures, but the general sociological significance of local conditions must be carefully assessed." . . . "It is safe to say that there is no evidence of general physical deterioration in the rural population. On the other hand, there is little if any indication of their physical superiority. Migration has not been sufficiently selective to leave the rural population physically inferior, and the general forces at work do not appear to have made it in any degree generally superior to the urban." 1

With improved nutrition, housing, and sanitation, improvements in personal habits as regards outdoor and other exercise, better service in dentistry and medicine, it seems probable that the urban population may develop standards of health in advance of those of the rural groups; and this because of higher real incomes and greater social opportunities.

As regards the mental quality of the rural population it is often suggested that migration has been highly selective. "The brightest have gone, the dull have been left behind." On the other hand, of course, there are those people who suggest that the highest mental qualities still arise amongst the rural population.²

The latest enquiry into mental deficiency, that of 1925-7, showed for the areas investigated a higher rate for rural than for urban areas. But

¹ See A. W. Ashby: "Sociological Background of Adult Education in Rural Districts," British Institute of Adult Education, London, 1935, p. 6.

² Ibid., p. 7, but see the whole of the discussion on mental quality, pp. 7-9.

Dr. Lewis, the Investigator for 1925-7, said, "It is only the impetuous reader who will conclude from our data that rural inhabitants as a group are generally inferior in mental endowments to the inhabitants of urban areas." 1

There is, however, evidence of intelligence tests which is supposed to indicate low levels of intelligence (as measured by the tests) in children of agricultural families.

After a study of Northumberland children Thomson and Duff showed average intelligence quotients ranging from 110 and 112 for children of managerial and professional classes to 97.6 for miners and agriculturists (all classes) and 96 for children of parents in "low-grade occupations," 2

For the Isle of Wight Macdonald's results for occupational groups showed the highest intelligence quotients for a "professional" group at 108.7, while "agriculture, all classes," at 96.7 was lowest but onenamely, "labourers and low-grade occupations" at 96.0.3

Working with a large number of children in " an eastern administrative county" Russell also found low intelligence quotients for children of agricultural families. The median intelligence quotient found "for farm labourers is rather lower than that for cowmen, horsemen, or shepherds, the élite of the workers on the farm. Of the children of farm labourers 1 per cent. scored intelligence quotients 120 plus and 32 per cent. scored less than 80." 4 Russell's intelligence quotient for children of farmers was 91 as compared with 98.4 found in Northumberland.

Cattell has published figures for a rural and an urban group in the south-west of England which show a mean intelligence quotient of 93.5 for country children as compared with that of 100.5 for the urban group.

In so far as it is possible, the results for children of parents in certain occupational groups have been tabulated for purposes of comparison (Table 11).

As Cattell goes a long way in inference and general statement, and some of his views seem to correspond with those not uncommonly expressed in talk, further quotation may be useful. He says: "All considerations indicate that the rural poverty of intelligence is due to a greater readiness of the more intelligent families to migrate to the towns." . . . "This higher average intelligence of the city is mainly of

¹ Report of Mental Deficiency Committee, 1929, Part 4, p. 72.

² British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XIV, "Social and Geographical Distribution of

Intelligence in Northumberland," pp. 192-8.

8 Hector Macdonald: "Social Distribution of Intelligence in the Isle of Wight," British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XVI, pp. 123-8.

⁴ J. B. Russell: "Measurement of Intelligence in a Rural Area," ibid., Vol. XX, PP. 275-95.

⁸ R. B. Cattell: "The Fight for our National Intelligence," London, 1937, pp. 12-13.

interest in illustrating the important sociological principle that other things being equal the more gifted biological strains will in time be found where the most attractive conditions exist, and vice versa." 1. . . "The town's advantages attract a superior biological sample of the population, though the city tends to sterilize and kill the very qualities which it attracts. The country continually supplies the cities with its better men, but the cities do not maintain them." 2

The rural population must indeed have been potent. For a long time it has not exceeded 22 per cent. of the total, or, say, 28 per cent. of the urban. Since 1851 it has not exceeded half, or since 1871 38 per cent. of the total. How it may be possible for 20 per cent. of the total, equal to 25 per cent. of the urban, to maintain a general high level of intelligence in towns and cities while "the city tends to sterilize and kill the very qualities it attracts" is best left to the imagination. Rural birthrates have never been sufficient to account for any such phenomenon.

TABLE 11
INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENTS OF CHILDREN OF AGRICULTURAL FAMILIES

| 0 | | | | Northum- berland Average. | Isle of | Eastern County. | | |
|-------------------------|----------|-----|--|---------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|--|
| Occupational Class of | of Paren | t. | | | Wight Average. | Range. | Median 82 | |
| Gamekeepers and rabbi | t-catch | ers | | | - | 122-69 | | |
| Farm foremen and baili | | | | _ | 108.8 | 147-83 | 99 | |
| Farm stewards, farm for | emen | | | 98.5 | - | _ | _ | |
| Dairy farmers . | | | | | 101.1 | - | | |
| Farmers | | | | 98.4 | 98.2 | 132-68 | 91 | |
| Small holders . | | | | - | _ | 121-67 | 10 | |
| Gardeners | | | | _ | 99.3 | 126-68 | 104 | |
| Shepherds | | | | 99.1 | 95.5 | 103-67 | 90 | |
| Horsemen | | | | _ | - | 121-64 | 90 | |
| Farm labourers and care | ters | | | - | 93.8 | - | - | |
| Farm labourers . | | | | 94.3 | _ | 120-60 | 87 | |
| Dairymen and milkmen | | | | _ | 93.1 | - | _ | |
| Cattlemen | | | | 92.7 | _ | - | - | |
| Cowmen | | | | - | 92.8 | 115-71 | 91 | |
| Stockmen | | | | - | _ | 124-72 | 88 | |
| Estate workers . | | | | - | 89.6 | - | - | |
| Skilled artisans . | | | | - | - | 149-64 | 98 | |
| Blacksmiths | | | | - | - | 126-73 | 97 | |

Cattell goes further into a suggested analysis and says "the character of the village itself, its cleanliness, the planfulness of its buildings and the general level of its prosperity were often strikingly related to the level of intelligence found."... "In nearly every case an estimate of the

1 Ibid., p. 15.

¹ J. B. Russell: "The Fight for our National Intelligence," London, 1937, pp. 13-14.

intelligence made on the appearance of the children and their enterprise in work and play was found to anticipate the independent test results."

. . . "There would be a high correlation between the prosperity of a village, its freedom from preventible ill-health, and the level of inborn mental capacity." He then pronounces a general judgment that intelligence "is in general higher in towns than country villages, but in very remote villages never tapped by the towns it is a little higher than in the towns."

On the latter point, it would be interesting to know where the very remote villages that have never lost population by migration were found, and what was the evidence that they have never been "tapped by the towns." Any such villages must have had rates of natural increase of population much lower than normal, for otherwise they would have grown into small towns during the last two centuries.

The importance of the results of intelligence tests in considering the effect of urban growth on the rural population lies largely in the suggestion that they measure "inborn mental capacity" or "constitutional ability independent of specialized education and training"—that children who show high intelligence quotients will tend to produce others who show similar results, and that children who show low quotients will in time produce children who will show a low level of intelligence.

The evidence on this point is unconvincing. The results of tests are largely, possibly wholly, determined by social factors such as the following:

- (1) Status of parents,
- (2) Number of children in family.2
- (3) Family income per head (which is partly independent of status),
- (4) Education or development of mental capacity and activity of parents and other persons with whom children have been closely associated (again partly independent of status),
- (5) Communicativeness of parents or other persons with whom children have been closely associated,
- (6) Strength of dialect or other local variations in language,
- (7) Character and quality of schools and other social institutions and organizations with which children have been associated,

¹ The intelligence test is a social implement, and testing is a social process, so both may be submitted to sociological tests.

² "The more intelligent are at every level reproduced in smaller families than the less intelligent." It is an interesting suggestion that a small number of children is evidence of high intelligence, and vice versa, or that high intelligence leads to the reduction of number of children. Alternatively, it is a strange commentary on the superiority of the supposed biologically superior people that they are either biologically or socially incapable of reproducing their numbers!

(8) Experience of tests or similar exercises, and skilled direction in developing experience with tests or similar exercises.

At many of these points rural children suffer in comparison with town children. Rural families are larger, incomes per head are lower, the standard of formal education of parents has been lower, in some areas they suffer from language disabilities, any lack of mental stimulation or of explanation or phenomena by parents is less likely to be made up by other contacts, and, on the whole, there is less likelihood of experience of exercises of the character of the tests.

It also seems necessary to suggest that the tests have been devised by persons with minds whose capacities and contents have been developed in urban environments; that the "intelligence" measured very largely takes its value from the requirements of success in urban environments and middle-class occupations; and these are reasons why children of professional families tend to show high intelligence quotients; while children from other environments tend to show poorer results.

However, the present conclusion must be that there is no evidence to show general mental deterioration of inheritable character in the rural population. There is, in fact, no evidence dealing with the mental quality of the whole rural population, or with the whole of any class, or with the whole of the group at any age-level, and none dealing with a fully representative sample of any class or any age-level.¹ Probably any differences in mental qualities in characteristics between the rural and urban populations of Great Britain are removable by post-natal social action.²

V. CONCLUSION

The main influences of urban growth on rural society and the countryside are economic and social in character. During the ten years 1928-37

- ¹ For Scotland there is the useful study, "The Intelligence of Scottish Children," University of London Press, 1933.
- ² A full measure of the differences in mental qualities of rural and urban populations probably should deal with:
 - (1) General intelligence,
 - (2) Educational attainments,
 - (3) Specific capacities—verbal, arithmetical, mathematical, manual, mechanical, etc., related to activities of occupational character,
 - (4) Special interests and special skills-games, hobbies, æsthetic expression, etc.,
 - (5) Emotional qualities—assertiveness, ambition, optimism, etc.,
 - (6) Moral qualities-honesty, truthfulness, reliability, etc.,
 - (7) Social qualities—ability to work with others, or to make change without conflict, etc.,

but I have not seen a score card on these lines. There are differences between the mental characteristics of rural and urban populations, but these are due to environmental and social causes.

"building and development" absorbed 460,000 acres of agricultural land, while sports grounds took another 108,000 acres, and both changes were mainly urban and industrial. More recently it appears that about 80,000 acres a year are being taken for non-agricultural purposes. Each 1,000 acres probably means loss of occupation to fifty workers (on the types and quality of land taken).

But far the most important social effect of the complex changes which gave society rising efficiency in agriculture with increasing industrialization and urbanization of population was that of lowering the ratio of agriculturists to the land they used, "scattering them over the face of the earth," and increasing the difficulty and costs of all social and cultural activities. Here is the dilemma: to raise output per person and income each agriculturist cultivated more land, and as the land per agriculturist increased there were fewer families to form churches, schools, and all the other forms of social organizations or, alternatively, agriculturists and members of their families had to travel farther for their social satisfactions. At various income levels there are maximum limits of distances which may be travelled for purposes of education and other social activities, but even when transport is available the time-cost of association tends to be high.

These conditions were accentuated by the decay of other rural industries, and by general industrial shifts to the more densely populated areas of different types: they were accentuated while the general rural population was diminishing from 1871 to 1921. But a new set of conditions has arisen. The total rural population is increasing, and it appears that the existing proportion of rural population in the total will not only be maintained but may be increased. With such change the social disabilities of agricultural and rural families should diminish. This maintenance of total rural population is being achieved with diminishing numbers and proportion of agriculturists, with increasing numbers of non-agriculturists keeping up a tendency to increase the total. The change does not occur uniformly, for those villages which have such amenities as piped watersupplies, electric current, and good transport (especially bus) services most easily retain their populations and even attract increases. Many of the villages which are denied these modern amenities are still losing population. In some parts of England a considerable redistribution of the rural population itself is going on; the larger and better villages are gaining and the smaller and poorer are losing.

There seems to be hope for rural England, and more generous aid to

¹ For details see Royal Commission on Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population, Seventh Day, December 1, 1938. Evidence of Sir Donald Fergusson, K.C.B. Ministry of Agriculture.

social services such as water-supplies (and sometimes sanitation), supplies of electricity at the same charges as in urban areas, higher capitation grants for education in areas with less than a specified density of population or children of school age per square mile, general improvement in facilities for rural education without any attempts at social fixation through rural schools, and better distribution of passenger facilities by road, would maintain the present population. But rural residence and industrial employment, successful retention of some crafts and development of small industries, are giving hope of an increase. A part of the increase in rural population, where it has occurred, is due to the earlier age of retirement from public employment and even from business and tendency of retiring persons to seek village residence. Many of these are acceptable and useful, but it would be unfortunate if they increased the influence of the older age-groups in the general rural population. A satisfactory future for rural society depends upon arrangements for a variety of gainful occupations in its territory, and upon the general supply of the amenities which modern civilization provides. Slowly but surely, yet much more rapidly than formerly, the rural population will absorb most of the elements of the common culture, and the adoption of common standards throughout will be good for society as a whole. Those people who do not approve current social attitudes and standards must attack them where they are most obvious, for they will not find a sub-normal, subservient rural population on which they can impose other standards with success.

LABOUR MIGRATION AND FERTILITY

By GORONWY H. DANIEL1

I. INTRODUCTION

PRIORI consideration suggests many ways in which internal migration could affect the birth-rate. The movement of a larger proportion of the population at ages with high fertility than at other ages would clearly tend to reduce the crude birth-rate of emigration or losing areas, and increase that of immigration or gaining areas. Local birth-rates would also be affected if migration were selective with respect to marital condition, or if the stream of migrants of a given age contained more fertile or more sterile persons than the remainder of the population at the same age. The fertility of the whole country would, of course, be unaffected by this type of migration, since the changes in the birth-rate of emigration districts would be balanced by opposite changes in immigration districts. Internal migration could, however, modify the fertility of the total population. In the first place, immigrants, especially those who had moved over long distances, would find themselves in a new and strange environment, and the number of children they have could be influenced by the adoption of new standards of living, by changes in their personal relationships, or by modifications in their knowledge and attitude towards the problem of family limitation. Secondly, the difficulties involved in actual movement, particularly if there were any expectation that subsequent movements might have to be made, could cause people to have smaller families; the birth of a child might be felt undesirable because of the family's economic insecurity, the high cost of travelling with a number of

¹ This study was carried out at the University of Oxford Institute of Statistics. Acknowledgment is due to Drs. Makower, Marschak, and Robinson for the considerable and generous help received from them at all stages of the work.

LABOUR MIGRATION AND FERTILITY

dependants, the difficulties in securing housing accommodation, or the absence of friends and relatives. A further factor which might lower fertility could be the separation of the migrant from his wife while searching for employment and a house. Reduction of the fertility of migrants in these ways would, unless it were counterbalanced by an increased fertility late in life, necessarily lead to a lowering of the birth-rate of the whole country. Changes in the volume of migration within a population might be one of the factors influencing its total fertility.

2. EXISTING LITERATURE

Although there is a considerable literature, especially American and Continental, on the subject of migration, and an even larger one on the subject of fertility, the writer has been unable to trace any special study of the relationship between the two. A few passing references to the problem can be found.¹ But they are clearly only incidental to the various matters discussed, and their failure to consider even such a pertinent difference as that between the age composition of migrants and non-migrants at various stages in their history makes it impossible to draw any valid conclusions from them.

In the case of this country the explanation of the deficiency of literature may lie in the complete inadequacy of published statistics for a study of the effects of migration on fertility. It is impossible to calculate separate birth-rates for the migrant and the native members of a population, since there

The Merseyside Survey, for instance, found that: "the mean number of children born per family to all immigrant families on Merseyside containing an adult male is little more than 3.0, whilst the mean number still living is about 2.5. Similar figures are available for the random sample of all families in Liverpool. They give 3.5 as the mean number of children born and 2.75 as the mean number living. . . . If the Irish are excluded, this difference in size becomes pronounced. . . . It is possible that delay in marriage resulting from a change of home is responsible for their somewhat smaller families" (Social Survey of Merseyside, vol. 1, p. 204, University of Liverpool Press, 1934). For other references see the extensive bibliographies in Thomas (Dorothy S.), Research Memorandum on Migration Differentials, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 43, New York, 1938; and Thompson (Warren S.), Research Memorandum on Internal Migration in the Depression, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 30, New York, 1937.

is no separate registration of births to migrants and births to natives. And unless the increase in population due to migration, and the difference between the fertility of migrants and non-migrants, is great, the effects of migration as measured by the birth-rates of the total population will be very small.¹ There are small administrative areas, such as the urban districts of Wembley and Dagenham, which have had a very high migration rate, but they have usually experienced intercensal boundary changes which cannot be accurately allowed for, because there are no records of births to transferred populations. The populations in these small areas are likely to be more affected than those in larger ones by the incidence of disturbing factors such as the effect of demobilization on the post-war birth-rate.

A further grave obstacle preventing the use of census material is the difficulty of measuring the amount of migration.² The migration rate published is based only upon net migration, that is, upon the balance of the inward and outward streams of people (both of natives and immigrants), and this may give quite a misleading indication of what really affects the number of children born to immigrants, namely, the number of immigrants times their length of stay. Moreover, it is clear that the published migration rate is something very heterogeneous, since it includes both long-distance and short-distance migration and does not differentiate between, say, persons moving from depressed areas and those moving from cities to suburban housing

If F_{m+n} = the fertility of the total population (including natives and migrants) as a percentage of that of the natives only,

p = number of migrants expressed as a percentage of the number of natives, F_m = the fertility of migrants as a percentage of that of natives,

then $F_{m+n} = \frac{10,000 + pF_m}{100 + p}$.

If the fertility of migrants were 80 per cent. of the native fertility, an increase in the population due to immigration of 25 per cent. (and no county in England and Wales in 1921-31 had as big an increase) would lower the fertility of the population by only 4 per cent.

² Some of these difficulties are discussed in the paper on "Labour Migration and Age Composition," published in the July, 1939, number of the Sociological Review.

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estates or from country to town. Finally, even if he possessed a technique refined enough to avoid these difficulties, the student would have the task of determining whether a relationship found between fertility and migration was a casual one or whether it was due to the simultaneous variation of, for instance, migration and prosperity and fertility.¹

3. Unemployment Insurance Material

It is clear that the statistics of the Registrar-General will not enable us to throw much light on the relationship between migration and fertility. For a study of this relationship we require clear-cut information about the fertility of migrants at different stages in their history. The only sources of such information known to the writer are the employment exchange documents known as claim units. These documents, relating to all persons insured against unemployment who have at some time claimed insurance benefit or unemployment assistance, give information about the claimants' industrial history and marital and family condition.² Extraction of data from the claim units is difficult, and there are a great many defects in the material

¹ In spite of the obvious deficiencies of the material, it was not thought impossible that the effects of migration on fertility might be so marked as to yield significant correlations. A correlation was actually tested between the percentage net migration into counties during the period 1921-31 and the percentage change in the crude birth-rate over the same period. The correlation coefficient obtained was + 0.7.

There is, of course, a correlation between migration and age, and fertility and age. The birth-rates for the counties were therefore standardized for age distribution and marital condition (using the indirect method of standardization described by Newsholme and Stevenson in a paper on "An Improved Method of Calculating Birth Rates," published in 1905 in the Journal of Hygiene, vol. 5, Nos. 2 and 3). Correlation of the change in the standardized birth-rates with the change due to migration gave a coefficient of only + 0.2, which was insignificant. There was, however, some indication that in counties which had gained by migration, the greater the net immigration the greater the fall in the birth-rate; while in counties which had lost by migration, the greater the net emigration the greater the fall in the birth-rate. The correlation coefficient for immigration counties alone was - 0.32 and for emigration counties alone + 0.46. But none of these values is significant, and it seems that, to find whether there is a relationship between migration and fertility, we have to use more accurate material.

² A full description of the material is given in the paper on "Labour Migration and Age Composition," loc. cit.

which impede its analysis. Yet the records appear to be unique in enabling some study to be made of the effects of migration upon fertility, and the present paper sets out the results of an examination which has been made of claim units relating to Welsh immigrants in Oxford.

Information derived from interviews with sixty representative Oxford Welshmen is also employed. Although the numbers interviewed are small, and although there are inherent difficulties in enquiries of this kind, so that inferences must be drawn with great caution, it is felt that study of this data is fully justified by the importance of first-hand information from the migrants.

For demographic purposes there are few defects in the claim-unit material in so far as it concerns the ages and dates of marriage of the claimants and their wives, but troubles arise when we attempt to use the dates of birth of the children to measure fertility.¹ The children recorded are those under the age of fourteen for whom benefit or assistance was claimed.² Since a mother cannot claim benefit for children fourteen years of age or over, there are no reliable records of the older children born to those persons who had been married for more than fourteen years before claiming benefit or assistance. Neither are there records of children who had been born and had lived and died while their fathers remained in continuous employment without once signing on at an exchange.

The claim units in the exchanges visited at the end of 1937 contained information about the claimants' marital and family condition, not only at the time when they last claimed benefit or assistance, but on all the occasions between 1931 and 1937 when they claimed payments.

¹ In a few cases, e.g. where the wife has always been employed and earning a regular wage, or engaged in an occupation normally carried on for profit, no information is available about the wife's date of birth, nor, frequently, about the date of marriage.

² The form U.I. 567K, giving details of the family fund and the ages of all members of the family, is filled in in cases where there was reason to believe that the claimant did not wholly or mainly maintain his dependants.

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All children for whom claims were made during this period are therefore recorded in the samples, whether they were still alive in 1937 or not. On the other hand, records for earlier years are not likely to be complete.

Because of these peculiarities of the material, special measures have been adopted in order to estimate fertility.

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Firstly, since the records may be incomplete for the earlier years, the analysis of fertility has been confined to the seven years 1931-37. If we had considered all the births recorded in the documents, whatever the ages of the children at the time of claiming, our figures would have been much influenced by mortality and the results would have been vitiated by lack of data concerning births taking place fourteen or more years before the date of claiming. These difficulties have been avoided by considering only births in the years 1931-37. These years have been subdivided into two periods, the fertility in each of which has been calculated separately and all of which have been combined together in the same proportions in order to obtain figures for the whole period. Comparison of subdivisions of the sample is therefore not invalidated by differences in the proportions of persons in different years as between those subdivisions.

Secondly, estimates of the amount of unemployment at different stages in the migrants' history have been made, so that we can allow for possible variations in the accuracy of the claim-unit record of births.

Thirdly, in measuring fertility, the aim has always been to use only those years of a man's history when, if he had had children, those children would have been recorded, and to relate to the number of such years only those children who were born in them.

Finally, to allow for the general deficiencies of the data, two control samples have been taken, one of the natives of South Wales (here called the Welsh Natives), and the other of natives of the migrants' present home (the Oxford

Natives). Significant differences between the Oxford Welshmen and these control samples are assumed to be connected with migration.

4. Effects of Migration upon Marriage

The effects of migration upon age composition have already been described—the predominance of young adults among the migrants tends to increase the birth-rates of immigration areas.² The results of this tendency are, however, mitigated to some extent, because it is largely single persons who migrate. The present evidence points clearly to the existence of a considerably lower proportion of married men among migrants than among non-migrants.

In Table I are set out the proportions of single to total migrants at each age when the Oxford Welshmen first emigrated from Wales, together with the proportions when the samples were taken at the end of 1937. The figures at the latter date are also given for the Welsh Natives and the Oxford Natives. It is apparent that, when the Oxford Welshmen left Wales, only a very small proportion of them were married, and that even in 1937, when they had been in Oxford on an average for 4.3 years (standard deviation = 0.13 years), this proportion was still lower than it was among

TABLE I
PERCENTAGE OF CLAIMANTS SINGLE AT EACH AGE

| | Welsh Natives. | Oxford We | Oxford Natives | |
|-----------------|----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------|
| | 1937. | At first migration from Wales. | 1937. | 1937. |
| 15-19 . | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 20-29 . | 72 | 89 | 74 | 66 |
| 30-39 . | 19 | | 74 26 | 13 |
| 40-49 · 50-64 · | 11 | 31 | | 14 |
| 50-64 . | 16 | 32 | 15 26 | 21 |
| All ages | 34 | 74 | 54 | 41 |

¹ See "Labour Migration and Age Composition," loc. cit. for a description of these samples.

^a See "Labour Migration and Age Composition." See also footnote 1 to p. 373 above.

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the two native populations. Thus although there was an excessive number of young adults among the migrants, the effect of this upon local birth-rates was, no doubt, reduced by the fact that relatively few of them were married.

The effect of the low proportion of married people among the migrants is brought out by the paternity rates given in a later section of this paper. These rates give the number of children who would be expected to be born to a man passing through the years 18-64 according to the experience of the three samples. Considering the total populations both married and unmarried, the paternity rate for the Oxford Welshmen was only 91 per cent. of that for the Welsh Natives and 86 per cent. of that for the Oxford Natives. On the other hand, taking only married men, the rate for the Oxford Welshmen was 110 per cent. of that for the Welsh Natives and 95 per cent. of that for the Oxford Natives. The relatively low rates obtained for the migrants when their total population is considered were clearly due to their lower proportion of married people.

Although the Oxford Welshmen had a lower proportion of married men in 1937 than had the two native populations, it seems that after leaving Wales they were marrying at a rate which was high both in relation to the native populations and in relation to the rate at which they married before leaving Wales. If we take as a unit one year of one man's life, then we can find the total number of man-years in each sample and divide this according to age and according to whether the men were single or married at the time. The number of marriages which actually took place divided by the number of single man-years at the same ages gives the rate of marriage of single men at each age. These rates were calculated for the three samples, and in the case of the Oxford Welshmen they were worked out separately for their pre-migration and post-migration history.¹ From Table II

¹ I.e. for that part of their history which preceded their first migration out of Wales and that part which followed it.

we see that, at all ages, there were relatively more Oxford Welshmen marrying after migration than before, although the difference is only significant in the age-groups 22-25 and 26-29. Further, except in the oldest age-group, the proportions of marriages among the two native populations were intermediate between those for the migrants. Thus it seems that before migration the Oxford Welshmen had a lower marriage rate than either the Welsh Natives or the Oxford Natives, but after migration their rate was much higher than the rates for the non-migrant populations.

What were the reasons for the high marriage rate of the Welsh immigrants in Oxford? Judging by the replies of

TABLE II

RATE OF MARRIAGE OF SINGLE MEN AT EACH AGE
(Marriages per 1,000 single man-years in each age group)

| | Welsh Natives. | Oxford | Welshmen. | Oxford Natives. | Differen | ces ÷ their Deviation. | Standard |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | (1) | Before Migration. (2) | After Migration. (3) | (4) | (3)-(1) | (3)-(2) | (3)-(4) |
| 18-21 22-25 26-29 30 + . | 39± 4.7 86± 8.1 117±12.7 52± 6.9 | 20± 3·6 81± 7·8 72±10·5 82±11·0 | 33± 8·1 140±14·2 139±15·1 96±11·4 | 29± 4·0 114±10·1 93±13·6 56± 8·0 | -0.60 +3.30 +1.10 +3.30 | +0.60 +3.70 +3.70 +0.90 | +0.4¢ +1.5¢ +2.3¢ +2.9¢ |

the Welshmen who were interviewed, the high rate was largely due to improvement in the migrants' economic position. There was complete agreement among all those interviewed that one of the most important questions relating to the possibility of marriage was whether they were earning enough money to support a wife and have a home of their own. The men were asked for details of their average income at three stages in their life, viz. during their last period of employment in Wales, during their first period of employment in Oxford, and during their last period of employment in Oxford. The answers of the men who were single at the time of migration indicate the

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improvement which took place after movement.1 Their average wage before migration was 45 (standard deviation = 8) shillings per week; during their first employment in Oxford it was 58 (standard deviation = 9) shillings per week; and during their last employment 78 (standard deviation = 10) shillings per week.2 These figures are in close agreement with other estimates of wages. Thus the average cash earnings per annum per person employed in the South Wales and Monmouthshire coal-mines during the years 1932-35 amounted to 45 shillings per week.3 The average earnings of builders' labourers in Oxford in 1937 were 54s. 3d. in summer and 51s. 4d. in winter, those of omnibus drivers 61s. to 69s. a week, and of omnibus conductors 52s, to 60s., while the average earnings of semiskilled motor workers were 70s. to 80s. a week.4 These published figures refer to all workers, but there is no reason to suppose that there should be any marked difference between the single and the married men's earnings. Bearing in mind, on the one hand, the differences in cost of living between Wales and Oxford and, on the other, the differences in incidence of unemployment, it seems clear that the economic position of the single migrants was considerably improved after their movement from the depressed area.5

¹ The men were asked for an estimate of their average weekly pay packets (i.e. wages excluding compulsory deductions) while in employment; over the whole period of their employment if that was less than a year, or for the last year if over a year's duration. It excludes insurance benefit and unemployment assistance receipts.

² It should be noted that it does not follow that all the Welsh migrants into Oxford experienced this improvement in wages, since these figures refer only to those who stayed in Oxford until the end of 1937, and these were presumably the most successful. Their less fortunate fellow-countrymen probably returned home or went elsewhere.

³ 22nd Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom (1922-36), Cmd. 5556.

4 Estimated in the Survey of the Social Services in the Oxford District, vol. 1, Oxford, 1938,

⁵ The cost of living appears to be considerably higher in Oxford than in Wales. Thus (though the migrants agreed on the whole that the houses were better and more laboursaving) rents are far higher than in Wales. The average of the total weekly payments made by the Welsh migrants (the total of rents and rates but excluding mortgages) was found to be 10s. 6d. in Wales and 17s. 8d. in Oxford. The chances of being unemployed are, however, far less in Oxford, as is shown by the difference between the average

At the same time it should be pointed out that this bettering of their position was only a gradual one and was not so marked immediately after migration as it was later. The first few weeks of employment were ones of economic insecurity, when the change of employment with which migration was usually associated introduced the uncertainty whether the new job could be successfully held. But with the passage of time the migrants were either discharged, and in that case probably left Oxford and are not included in the present sample, or prospered and reached a higher level of security. It is unlikely that the immigrants took more than a year to settle down in their new employment and begin earning enough money to get married.

A feature of the immigrants' life in Oxford which emerged clearly from a majority of the interviews was their difficulty in adjusting themselves quickly to their new surroundings, and their feeling of acute loneliness. Coming from an industrial area with very different traditions from those of Oxford, and leaving behind them their old friends, they found the first months of life difficult, confused, and lonely. Only gradually, after making new friends and acquiring new interests, did they become more settled in their new environment. Marriage was perhaps an important means

of bringing about this adjustment.

The strength of this latter factor is evident when we consider that many of the migrants left prospective wives in Wales when they first came to Oxford, and in fact were often only awaiting an opportunity for getting married. There is quite a considerable movement to and fro between Oxford and Wales during holidays, during week-ends, and during spells of unemployment, and the migrants thus have opportunities for meeting old friends and also for making

unemployment rate (based on quarterly rates) during the years 1932-37 of 31 per cent. for Wales and only 7.2 per cent. for Oxford. The migrants interviewed were also asked whether on the whole they felt themselves to be economically better off in Oxford than they were in Wales. Emphatic affirmatives were given by 44 of the 45 men who were single at migration.

new acquaintances.¹ Reasons such as these explain the fact that eleven of the twenty-one men interviewed who had married after leaving Wales had married a fellow country-woman.² The remaining ten men had married English women; six of these men, however, were either Englishmen who had lived in Wales and had entered insured industry there, or were Welshmen who had lived many years in England before marriage.

It might be thought that, owing to an excess of male over female migrants, immigration areas would have some shortage in the number of eligible women, and that this might reduce the number of marriages, delay marriage, or produce abnormal differences in the ages of husbands and wives. It seems, however, that there is no deficiency of women among the younger migrants. Comparison of the propor-

¹ It is a common practice for many immigrants to return home when they become unemployed rather than to wait in Oxford until they resume employment. The reason for this is that they find it far cheaper to live at home on unemployment payments than in lodgings in Oxford.

² A factor which no doubt affects marriage is the preference expressed by many of the migrants for Welsh wives. These men considered women born in Oxford to be "different," "too reserved," "too fond of going into pubs—a thing that no respectable girl would think of doing in Wales," "bad housewives," and "poor cooks—too fond of tins and bakers' bread." Some of those asked agreed that perhaps the same could be said of many a Welsh girl living in England, but maintained that "a girl from home" would make the best wife.

It is possible that these statements are merely an expression of patriotism, or that they are the result of a natural tendency to idealize those things which are left behind. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that there are real differences of attitude and outlook between the inhabitants of the old University town and the natives of the mining valleys of South Wales. We can look upon the Oxford Welshmen as men adjusted to the behaviour and values characteristic of Wales, who are uprooted and forced to readjust themselves to alien surroundings. From this point of view it is easy to understand their loneliness on arrival in Oxford, their feeling that Welshwomen are more "homely" and "make better wives," and the high proportion of them who marry Welshwomen.

³ See "Labour Migration and Age Composition," where it is pointed out that there was a relatively high ratio of females to males in the net population change due to migration, 1921-31, in the Oxford County Borough, the London area, and Glamorganshire and Monmouthshire. The number of female migrants 14-29 years of age per 100 males of the same age was 104 for Oxford, 125 for the London area, and 131 for the two Welsh counties.

It is also noteworthy that Hill, using a slightly different method for estimating net migration, found that in the case of emigration from Essex in 1851-1911 there was an

tion of young single men to young single women in immigration and emigration areas in 1931 gives no indication of a relative shortage of women in the gaining areas; in fact it suggests the contrary.

Sex Ratio Among Unmarried Persons 15-34 Years of Age in 1931 (Females per 100 males)

| Oxford County Borough | | | 102 |
|-----------------------|--------|--|-----|
| London and Home Cou | nties† | | 102 |
| South Wales: | | | 82 |
| England and Wales . | | | 97 |

* Excluding the student population.
† The South-East Region of the 1931 Census.
‡ The Wales I Region of the 1931 Census.

Some of the migrants had married women (both English and Welsh) who had lived in places such as Reading, Swindon, High Wycombe, and London. Thus the women available for marriage were apparently not confined to those living in their old homes in Wales or in Oxford, but included women living within a considerable radius of Oxford.¹

It remains to consider whether migration affected age at marriage or the gap between the age of husband and wife.

Table III shows the percentage age distribution at marriage of the Oxford Natives, the Oxford Welshmen, and the Welsh Natives. Separate figures are also given for the Oxford Welshmen who married before migration and those who married after migration. The mean ages at marriage are seen to lie within 25.6 and 28.0 years. It is not correct, however, to take the averages worked from these distributions as the criteria of the real difference in age at marriage unless we can assume that the numbers available for marriage at each age were the same for the four populations. The

excess of female over male migrants at young adult ages. (See Hill, A. B., 1925, Internal Migration and its Effects upon the Death-rates: with special reference to the County of Essex, Medical Research Council Special Report Series, No. 95, pp. 36-40 and p. 43).

The majority of the migrants have bicycles, motor-bicycles, or motor-cars, or friends who possess these means of travel. Considerable advantage is taken also of cheap railway excursion tickets and of trips organized by sports committees and other organizations.

TABLE III
AGE OF HUSBANDS AT MARRIAGE

| Age Groups. | Welsh Natives. | Married before Migration. (2) | Married after Migration. (3) | Total of (2) and (3) (4) | Oxford Natives. |
|---|-------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 18- | 22.8 | 23.5 | 9.3 | 17.9 | 15.2 |
| 22- | 34.4 | 42.2 | 34.3 | 39.1 | 15·2 46·1 |
| 26- | 25.2 | 16.9 | 32.4 | 23.0 | 19.6 |
| 30- | 11.3 | 10.8 | 11.1 | 10.0 | 13.2 |
| | 4.0 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 2.9 |
| 34- 38- | 1.3 | 1.8 | 4.6 | 2.9 | 1.2 |
| 42- | 1.0 | 1.2 | 3.7 | 2.2 | 1.2 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Mean age at mar- riage with Stand- ard Error . Ditto (corrected for numbers available | 26·0± ·31 | 25·6 ± ·28 | 28·o ± ·41 | 26·5 ± ·24 | 26·2 ± ·34 |
| in each age-group) | 25.8 | 26.7 | 26.8 | 26.7 | 26.1 |

four age distributions at marriage were therefore recalculated by applying the ratio between the numbers marrying and the total number of single man-years of history recorded in the various age-groups in each sample to a standard population comprising the total man-years in all three samples.

Table I shows that the average age of the Oxford Welshmen who married before migration is changed by this correction to 26.7, whereas the figure for those who married after migration is changed to 26.8. Thus the difference previously found appears to have been due entirely to the fact that the men available for marriage after migration were older than the men available before migration, and there is no evidence that migration itself affects age at marriage.

When we compare the two native populations with the whole body of migrants, including both those who married after migration and those who married before, we find that the migrants were 0.9 years older at marriage than the natives. It seems, therefore, that both the married men who moved, and the single men who moved, married slightly later than the men who remained in Wales. The difference in age, however, is small.

TABLE IV

DIFFERENCES IN AGE BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Oxford Welsh Married before Migration

| | | | | 1 | Age of I | lusband | at Mar | riage in | Years. | | | 1 | |
|---------------|---------|------|-----|-----|----------|---------|--------|----------|--------|-----|-----|--------|------|
| Numb | er of y | ears | 18- | 22- | 26- | 30- | 34- | 38- | 42- | 46- | 50- | Total. | %'8. |
| 16 + 12-15 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 2 | -6 |
| 8-11 | | | | | 3 | 5 | 2 2 | 2 | 1 | | | 13 | 7.8 |
| 4-7 | | | | 15 | 10 | 4 | 1 | | | | 1 | 30 | 18.1 |
| 0-3 | | | 26 | 43 | 14 | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | | 89 | 53.6 |
| 4-1 8-5 | | | 10 | 10 | 1 | 4 | | | | 1 | 1 | 25 | 15.1 |
| 8-5 | | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 5 | 3.0 |
| 12-9 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 | .6 |
| 16-13 | | | | | | | | | | | | - | |
| | er of y | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | | | 39 | 70 | 28 | 18 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | | 166 | |

Mean difference in age between husband and wife $= 2.67 \pm .16$ years. Mean difference in age between husband and wife (corrected for differences in numbers marrying at each age) = 3.0 years.

Oxford Welsh Married after Migration

| | | | | Age of Husband at Marriage in Years. | | | | | | | | Total. | 96'8. |
|---------------|---------|------|-----|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------|-------|
| Numbe | r of ye | | 18- | 22- | 26- | 30- | 34- | 38- | 42- | 46- | 50- | Total. | 70 0 |
| 16+ | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 2 | 1.8 |
| 12-15 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 2 | 1.0 |
| 8-11 | | | | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | | | | 11 | 10.3 |
| 4-7 | • | | | 9 | 8 | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | 24 | 22.3 |
| 0-3 | | | 4 | 21 | 16 | 4 2 | 1 | 3 | | | 1 | 47 | 43.5 |
| 4-1 8-5 | | | 5 | 6 | 7 | | | - | | | | 18 | 16.7 |
| | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 3 | 2.8 |
| 12-9 | | | | | | | | | | | | - | |
| 16-13 Numb | er of y | ears | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | .9 |
| Total | · | | 10 | 37 | 35 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | | 108 | 100.0 |

Mean difference in age between husband and wife = 3·18 ± ·33 years. Mean difference in age between husband and wife (corrected for differences in numbers marrying at each age) = 2·8 years.

Table IV shows the mean gap between the ages of husband and wife. This was greater in the case of the migrants who married after migration than those who married before. There is no evidence, however, that this difference represents a real difference between the two bodies of migrants in the

ages of individual couples, since it again appears that the greater mean value obtained for the men who married after they had left Wales is due to the fact that these men were on the whole older than the others when they married. On the basis of the distribution in Table IV we find that, if the numbers marrying at each age had been the sum of those at that age who married before plus those who married after migration, the difference between the mean gaps for the two sub-samples would have been negligible.

The conclusions which appear to be indicated by this study of marriage in the three samples of claimants may now be drawn together. It is stressed again that these conclusions relate only to those men who did not return home, and that their history may have differed widely from that of the

unsuccessful migrants.

The migrants were a body of people selected with respect to marital condition. Compared with non-migrants they

contained a large number of single men.

After migration the proportion of marriages to the total number of single men increased rapidly, both in relation to the pre-migration history and in relation to the samples of the two native populations. This increase may have been due to the improvement (after an initial period of insecurity and no great increase in income) in the migrants' economic position. Other factors may have been that many of the men had women friends in Wales whom they were waiting to marry, and that marriage was perhaps a way of overcoming the psychological and social maladjustments set up by the change in environment.

There is little evidence that both the migrants who married before and those who married after migration married at older ages than the native populations. Comparing migrants who married before and migrants who married after migration, there is no evidence that migration affected

age at marriage.

5. THE EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON FERTILITY

We may begin this consideration of the effects of migration on fertility by comparing the fertility of the Oxford Welshmen with that of the two control populations. Paternity rates were constructed for each sample based upon the ratios found at each year of age between the number of children born and the number of men recorded at those ages. The children were related to their fathers rather than to their mothers, because in this study we are concerned with male, not female, migration. Since we have information about the claimants up to the age of 64, it is not likely that we miss many births to men of advanced age.¹

In calculating the paternity rates, years of age relating to calendar years preceding 1931, and to periods of employment in non-insured occupations, were excluded, as also were the children born in those years. The sums of the children recorded in each year of age were each divided by the sums of the number of histories represented at the same ages, and the resulting quotients totalled to give the paternity rate.² The rate is thus a measure of the total number of children who would be born to a man passing through the ages of 18-64 according to the experience of the men in the samples who were in insured employment in the years 1931-37.³

¹ The child born to the oldest father in the three samples was one born to a man 61 years of age.

² The standard deviations of the quotients in each year of age were calculated from the formula:

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}\left(1-\frac{1}{r}\right)}$$

where n = the number of man-years in the year of age,

p = the number of births per man-year in the same age-group,

 $\frac{1}{r}$ = the sampling factor for the whole sample.

In Table V the proportions of births to man-years in each year of age are added together to give the expectation of births for men passing through four years of age.

³ None of the claimants was married before the age of 18, and we have therefore only considered the years of age 18-64.

TABLE V PATERNITY RATES BY AGE-GROUPS FOR MARRIED MEN

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| | Welsh Nati | | Welsh Nati | ves. | Oxford We | elsh. | Oxford Natives. | | |
|--------------|------------|----|----------------------|----------------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------|--|
| Age | Grou | p. | Children per man. | % of Total. | Children per man. | % of Total. | Children per man. | % of Total | |
| 18-21 | | : | ·061 ± ·015 | 2.5 | ·058 ± ·010 ·393 ± ·026 | 2·2 14·6 | ·067 ± ·017 | 2.4 | |
| 26-29 | | | ·496 ± ·048 | 20.3 | ·352 ± ·027 | 13.1 | ·501 ± ·040 | 17.7 | |
| 30-33 | | | ·487 ± ·051 | 19.9 | ·377 ± ·033 | 14.0 | ·615 ± ·061 | 21.7 | |
| 34-37 | | | ·435 ± ·052 | 17.8 | ·404 ± ·040 | 15.0 | ·453 ± ·058 | 16.0 | |
| 38-41 | | | ·408 ± ·053 | 16.7 | -281 ± -038 | 10.2 | ·285 ± ·055 | 10.1 | |
| 42-45 | | | ·176 ± ·040 | 7.2 | ·316 ± ·044 | 11.8 | ·209 ± ·052 | 7.4 | |
| 46-49 | | | ·104 ± 032 | 4.5 | ·181 ± ·037 | 6.7 | ·201 ± ·054 | 7.1 | |
| 50-53 | | | ·025 ± ·017 | 1.0 | ·099 ± ·039 | 3·7 8·4 | ·087 ± ·050 | 3.1 | |
| 54 + | | • | _ | - | ·225 ± ·085 | 8.4 | ·044 ± ·042 | 1.6 | |
| Total . | | 4 | 2.449 ± .120 | 100.0 | 2·686 ± ·144 | 100.0 | 2.828 ± .151 | 100.0 | |
| Total only . | 18- | 49 | 2.424 ± .115 | | 2·362 ± ·095 | | 2·697 ± ·143 | | |

Oxford Natives—Oxford Welsh = $.7\sigma^*$ (ages 18 +) and 2.3 σ (ages 18-49). Oxford Natives—Welsh Natives = 2.0σ (ages 18 +) and 1.5 σ (ages 18-49). Welsh Natives—Oxford Welsh = 1.3σ (ages 18 +) and $.4\sigma$ (ages 18-49). Figures underlined are those which differ significantly (i.e. with a difference exceeding two standard decided are those which differ significantly (i.e. with a difference exceeding two standard decided are those which differ significantly (i.e. with a difference exceeding

two standard deviations) from the corresponding figures for the Oxford Welshmen.

* Differences as multiples of their standard deviations.

Table V shows the paternity rates for the three samples calculated for the married men only. The rates were also obtained for the total population both married and single, and were found to be 2.01 (standard deviation = .10) for the Welsh Natives, 1.90 (standard deviation = .11) for the Oxford Welsh, and 2.19 (standard deviation = .13) for the Oxford Natives. The differences between these rates are not great enough to be significant. The rates for the married men lie within the slightly greater range of 2.45-2.83. These values, it may be noted, do not deviate greatly from gross reproduction rates for the whole country worked from census data. Thus Kuczynski1 gives 0.93 as the gross reproduction rate for England and Wales in 1931, and 0.87 in 1935, and these rates, if doubled so as to include the births of boys, are of the same order of magnitude as the

¹ R. R. Kuczynski, "The International Decline of Fertility," in Political Arithmetic, ed. by L. Hogben, London, 1938.

paternity rates for the total sample populations. The comparison cannot, of course, be pushed far, because the present measures refer to populations which are from restricted localities, have a restricted industrial and social origin, and the fertility measured relates to the years 1931-37.

Considering the contribution made by each age-group towards the paternity rates for each sample, two points of difference stand out which distinguish the migrants from both the native populations: the migrants have a relatively high fertility late in life and a very low fertility in the ages 26-41. In some age-groups the differences are not large enough to be significant, but in the case of the age-groups 26-29, 30-33, and 42-45 the rates appear to be significantly different from those found for the control samples.

The method used in Table V for comparing fertilities can be criticized on two grounds. In the first place, it is unrealistic in so far as it equates the number of man-years in each age-group to unity, since none of the populations contains as many persons in the older age-groups as in the younger. The rates which it yields are hence biased in favour of the older ages and attach too little weight to the

rates prevailing in the younger ages.

Secondly, although the samples of the three populations are small, we take the sum of the ratios of births to fathers for each year of age, 18-65, so that births and man-years are distributed among forty-seven groups. As a result, the older years of age, in which the numbers of births and fathers tail off very irregularly, tend to have abnormal ratios and high standard deviations. It seems desirable that the number of class intervals should be reduced.

These criticisms have been met in Table VI by taking broad age-groups and relating the total number of births in each age-group to the total number of man-years in it, so that no man-years are unaccounted for. The resulting ratios have been multiplied by the average distribution of man-years by age in the three samples. Thus the table

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tells us, for instance, that for every 494 man-years at ages 18-25 the Welsh Natives had 12.83 children and the Oxford Welshmen 15.67. The total of these weighted rates gives the number of children per 1,000 man-years for each sample on the assumption that the proportion of man-years in each broad age-group was the proportion for all three samples added together. These totals were worked out separately for the periods 1931-33 and 1934-37, and then combined together in the same proportions to cover the whole period. Table VI shows, but perhaps a little more clearly, the

TABLE VI
INCIDENCE OF CHILDREN IN BROAD AGE-GROUPS
(Weighted according to average age distribution of man-years)

| | | | | Number of | Number of children (with standard deviation of number) | | | | | |
|----------|----------------|--------|-------------|----------------|--|-----------------|--------------|--|--|--|
| | Age-groups. | | man-years. | Welsh Natives. | Oxford Welsh. | Oxford Natives. | | | | |
| | | | | | Total | all Men. | | | | |
| 18-25 | | | . | 494 | 12.83 ± 1.51 | 15.67 ± .91 | 16.77 ± 1.75 | | | |
| 26-33 | | | | 214 | 21.12 ± 1.53 | 13.61 ± .80 | 23.49 ± 1.72 | | | |
| 34-41 | | 9 | | 137 | 12.24 ± 1.09 | 9.05 ± .73 | 10.42 ± 1.14 | | | |
| 42-64 | | | | 155 | 2·82 ± ·49 | 5.81 ± .64 | 3.86 ± .68 | | | |
| Total n | umbe per 1, | r of c | hil- an- | | | | | | | |
| years | | • | . 1 | 1,000 | 49.01 ± 2.46 | 44·14 ± 1·60 | 54.54 ± 2.80 | | | |
| | | | 1 | | Married | Men Only. | | | | |
| 18-25 | | | | 445 | 1 16.36 ± 1.89 | 23.94 ± 1.04 | 22.97 ± 2.38 | | | |
| 26-33 | | | | 227 | 27·89 ± 1·99 | 20.65 ± 1.20 | 31.37 ± 2.26 | | | |
| 34-41 | | | . | 151 | 15.91 ± 1.41 | 13.39 ± 1.08 | 14'44 ± 1'57 | | | |
| 42-64 | | | . | 177 | 3·68 ± ·62 | 8.53 ± .93 | 5.39 ± .96 | | | |
| Total no | imbe | r of c | hil- | | | | | | | |
| years | | , | | 1,000 | 63.84 ± 3.15 | 66.51 ± 2.13 | 74·17 ± 3·77 | | | |

Figures underlined are those which differ significantly (by more than two standard deviations) from the comparable figures for the Oxford Welshmen.

same differences as those indicated by the paternity rates in Table V. The fertility of the married Oxford Welshmen and the married Welsh Natives is seen to have been well below that of the Oxford Natives.

The fertility rates may still be inaccurate because of the bias introduced by differences in the incidence of unemployment among the three populations. Inasmuch as unemploy-

ment insurance benefits with respect to children are only claimed when the fathers are out of work, the chances of children being recorded on the claim units will depend upon their chances of being born while their fathers were unemployed, or of surviving until they did lose work. The two control-groups, however, allow us to check whether differences in the incidence of unemployment or in infant mortality operating in this way could account for the differences illustrated by the tables. The incidence of unemployment is higher among the two Welsh populations than among the Oxford people, and we should therefore expect a greater proportion of all births to be recorded in their case than in that of the Oxford Natives.1 It follows that the figures should, if anything, under-estimate the extent to which the fertility of the Welsh populations is below that of the Oxford Natives.

This low fertility found for Wales may be thought surprising in view of the very high rates which have been associated with its population. It must be remembered, however, that the present figures relate not to the total population but to that part of the insured population which claimed benefit or assistance. Moreover, up to 1931, after which year absence of the necessary data prevents us from getting a glimpse of the changes which were going on, the fertility of the total population of Glamorganshire, Monmouthshire, and Carmarthenshire is shown by Charles and Moshinsky to have been experiencing a far sharper decline than that of Oxfordshire or the rest of England and Wales.²

¹ Since we are dealing with populations which are on very similar economic levels, differences in the survival rate of young children are unlikely to be very large. Affecting the records only in so far as children were born during spells of employment, and operating only until the end of such spells, the effects of these differences can be assumed to be very small.

² Charles (Enid) and Moshinsky (Pearl), "Differential Fertility in England and Wales during the Past Two Decades." Reprinted in *Political Arithmetic*, ed. by Lancelot Hogben, London, 1938. The gross reproduction rates given in this paper for England and Wales fell from 1.442 in 1911 to 0.930 in 1931; those for Oxfordshire fell only from 1.449 in 1911 to 0.984 in 1931, while those for Glamorgan fell as much as from 2.251 to 1.072.

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Table VI shows that the total number of children per 1,000 man-years born to the married Oxford Welshmen was a little higher than that born to the Welsh Natives, but the difference is much too small to be significant.

If we turn our attention to the relative contribution made by different age-groups to the total fertility of each population, we find the same differences between the age pattern for the migrants and that for the native samples as were indicated by Table V. The fertility of the migrants was well below that of both the others in the age-group 26-33, and above it at ages over 41. Even if differences in the incidence of unemployment could account for the fertility of the migrants at young ages being less than that of the Welsh Natives, it could not account for its being less than that of the Oxford Natives at the same ages. Again, if it could account for the difference in fertility at ages over 41 between the migrants and the Oxford Natives, it could not explain the difference between the migrants and the Welsh Natives.

This low fertility followed by a high fertility suggests that among the migrants there was a staggering of fertility for some reason, so that the loss of births at early ages was made up in later years. The figures, however, are composite, and the same men are not represented at every age. The supposition that fertility was postponed until later in life requires that the fathers who had children after the age of 41 were men who could have had them as early as between their 26th and 33rd birthdays and refrained from so doing. But out of the thirty-nine children born to men over the age of 41, only fourteen belonged to men who were married before reaching the age of 33. Ten of these belonged to men who had had four or more children, and the youngest offspring were clearly born late, not because their fathers had postponed having children, but because their fathers had large families. Thus only four out of the thirty-nine children could be said to belong to fathers who could have

had children earlier in life but postponed doing so. On the other hand, as many as thirty of the thirty-nine children born to fathers over 41 years of age were born before their fathers had migrated. Thus the real explanation of the high rates found among the older migrants appears to be that a great many of the older Oxford Welshmen were married men with large families who moved late in life. Ten of the fourteen men who were married before the age of 33 had children of working age when they moved, and it is likely that factors contributing towards the movement of these men were the facilities for transference afforded by the Ministry of Labour's Family and Household Removal Scheme to families whose younger members found work outside the Special Areas and to migrants with dependants.¹

The total fertility of the Oxford Welshmen was thus raised by the movement of middle-aged migrants with large families: if the older ages are excluded, the fertility of the migrants is shown by Tables V and VI to have been lower

than that of both the other two populations.

The question arises whether this low fertility of the migrants at young ages was due directly to migration. A test of this hypothesis is given if the average intervals between the births of successive children are found for births which took place before migration, after migration, and for cases where migration occurred between marriage and the birth of a child, or between the births of successive children. Since the gaps might be expected to be of different length according to the age of the father, and since their length might also be affected by differences in the distribution over time of each category of gaps (due either to differences in fertility between different calendar years, or to the omission

¹ Discussion of the increase in the proportion of older men migrating from Wales during the three years 1935-37, and of the part which the operation of the Industrial Transference Scheme may have played, will be found in "Labour Migration and Age Composition," loc. cit., pp. 295-302. It may be repeated that the large families of these older migrants included children who were grown up. It will be shown in a later paper that men with a large number of young dependent children are very immobile.

from the claim units of a greater proportion of births taking place in early years than of those in late) the average gaps have been corrected for differences in the time distribution and age distribution of the births in each of the three categories.¹ The results are shown in Table VII.

TABLE VII

Average Number of Weeks between Marriage and Birth of First Child and between Births of Successive Children: Oxford Welshmen

(Corrected for age and time)

| | | Before Migration. | With Migration (a) | After Migration |
|--------------------|--|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Marriage—1st child | | 52·9 ± 4·3 | 86.2 ± 13.5 | 52·9 ± 4·9 |
| Between children | | 100.4 ± 11.3 | 127·5 ± 6·6 | 122·7 ± 8·8 |
| Total gaps (b) . | | 70·1 ± 5·0 | 101.8 + 8.7 | 79·3 ± 4·5 |
| Total gaps (b, c) | | 86.6 + 9.1 | 115.2 ± 13.4 | 107.7 ± 7.9 |

(a) Gaps with migration are those where migration took place between the births, or between marriage and the birth of the first child.

(b) Proportion of gaps between children and between marriage and first child kept

constant for all three samples.

(c) Total excluding those gaps between marriage and first child which were less than

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40 weeks.

Averages are given with their standard deviation. Figures underlined are those which differ significantly from the corresponding figures for gaps with migration.

This table suggests that there was a markedly longer gap between the births of children in those cases where migration took place in the intervening period than in the others. A fact which emerged from a study of the gaps between marriage

¹ Let y = the total number of gaps in any age-group, and

x = the mean length of the total gaps in any age-group.

Let suffixes 1, 2, 3, . . . denote different age-groups.

Let suffixes B, W, A, denote gaps recorded before, with, and after migration,

and suffixes T_1 , T_2 , T_3 , . . . denote gaps representing births in different calendar years. Then the mean gap $M^1_{T_1B}$ corrected for age, for births taking place before migration in any year (e.g. T_1) is:

$$x_{1B}\Sigma y_1 + x_{2B}\Sigma y_2 + x_{3B}\Sigma y_3 + .../\Sigma y = M'x_{1B}$$

and the mean gap, corrected for age and time, of births taking place before migration is:

$$M'_{T_1B}.\Sigma y_{T_1} + M'_{T_2B}.\Sigma y_{T_2} + .../\Sigma y = M''_B$$

Further, if σ = the standard deviation of the mean length of gap, then (assuming no correlaton between length of gap in different age-groups and between length of gap and year of birth) $\sigma^2 = \sigma^2 - (\sum y_1)^2 + \sigma^2 - (\sum y_2)^2 + ... /(\sum y_n)^2$

year of birth)
$$\sigma_{\bf 1}^2 = \sigma_{\bf 1}^2 (\Sigma y_1)^2 + \sigma_{\bf 1}^2 (\Sigma y_2)^2 + .../(\Sigma y)^2$$

and $\sigma_{\bf 1}^2 = \sigma_{\bf 1}^2 (\Sigma y_1)^2 + \sigma_{\bf 1}^2 (\Sigma y_2)^2 + .../(\Sigma y)^3$

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and first child was the markedly high proportion of gaps of less than 40 weeks' duration.¹ Since it is doubtful whether the length of gaps for persons who had children within a short time of marriage was due to the same causes as affected the length of other gaps, Table VII contains another total from which births taking place within 40 weeks of marriage are excluded. Gaps with migration are seen to have been still longer than those before or after movement, but because of the reduction in the number in the sample the differences are on a low level of significance. There is only a 7 per cent. probability that the differences are due to chance in the first case but a 61 per cent. probability in the other.²

The table thus does not establish the existence of a longer gap between births separated by migration than between births after migration, although it shows almost conclusively that there was a longer gap in the case of the

former than in the case of births before migration.

Finally, an analysis was made of the histories of the migrants, and their fertility was estimated at various stages in their history. Each history was divided into four parts. The first part was taken as the period more than two years before the first migration from Wales; the second part was the two years before first migration; the third part was the two years following the first migration from Wales unless another movement was made before the end of two years, in which case it was taken as dating from the first movement to the time two years after this other migration; the fourth part was the remainder of the time spent away from Wales. These four stages thus represent the period when the migrant was living in Wales and was presumably not thinking of

² Using R. A. Fisher's t-test.

¹ The following figures give the length in weeks of the gap between marriage and first child in the case of the Oxford Welshmen:

^{0- 20- 40- 60+} Total Percentage 0-39 weeks
21 36 15 28 100 57 per cent. (Stand. Dev. = 5.9)

The percentages were much the same before and after migration (52 per cent. and 59 per cent. respectively). For the Oxford Natives they were 47 per cent. (Stand. Dev. = 5).

moving away, the period immediately antecedent to his movement, the period of migration and of adjustment to his new home, and the time when his life was more or less

settled in England.

Fertility rates for the Oxford Welshmen in each of these periods were obtained after, first of all, shifting back each date of birth by thirty-nine weeks so as to give approximately the date of conception. Ratios of children to man-years of fathers for each period were then found as they were found for the whole body of migrants in Table VI. Since the average age of the claimants in each period, and also the average of the calendar years covered varied from period to period in the migrant's history, it was also necessary to correct for differences in age and time between the four periods, and to do this the data for each period were classified into two divisions according to time, and into four age-groups. Fertility rates for each of these small divisions were found by relating the number of births to the number of fathers recorded (the births being shifted back 39 weeks as explained above), and the eight rates for each period were then combined together in the same proportions, i.e. given the same weights. The age-groups were combined in two ways. They were combined together giving equal weighting to each age, and they were also weighted according to the average age composition of all four periods of history.

Table VIII shows the values obtained for each period. It shows that fertilities in the period more than two years before migration, in the period two years before migration, and in the period more than two years after migration were very similar, the differences being no more than 3 per cent. of the total fertility in any one period. The values for the two years after migration, on the other hand, were only about 69 per cent. of those for all the other periods, and the difference cannot be accounted for by random sampling errors. During the history of the migrants it

TABLE VIII

FERTILITY AT DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE HISTORY OF MARRIED OXFORD WELSHMEN (CORRECTED FOR AGE AND TIME, AND WITH BIRTHS SHIFTED BACK 30 WEEKS)

| | With equal weights for each Age-group. | Age-groups weighted ac- cording to age composi- tion of total population |
|---|--|--|
| (1) Period ending 2 years before migration (2) Period including the 2 years before | ·491 ± ·052 | ·480 ± ·052 |
| migration | ·473 ± ·047 | ·492 ± ·048 |
| (3) Period including migration and the 2 | | |
| years after | ·313 ± ·042 | ·326 ± ·043 |
| (4) Period beginning 2 years after migra- tion | ·439 ± ·035 | ·467 ± ·035 |
| tion . | ·453 ± ·124 | ·470 ± ·024 |
| Difference between (3) and $(1) = .$ | 2.70 | |
| Difference between (3) and $(2) =$ | 2.50 | 2·3σ 2·6σ |
| Difference between (3) and (4) = | 2.30 | 2.50 |
| Difference between (3) and (5) = | 2.90 | 2.90 |

seems, therefore, that, excluding differences due to advancing age, there was no change in fertility except in the period which included their movement and the following two years. In that period fertility was very low.

We must now consider the possibility that the extent to which all children were recorded on the claim units at each of the four stages was affected by variations in the incidence of unemployment between the stages. Since such variations are likely to exist as between different periods of the migrants'

history, an attempt was made to measure the relative amount of unemployment which the Oxford Welshmen experienced before migration, during the two years starting at the date of migration, and during the subsequent years. Each man's history was divided into these three periods and the number of years with complete employment histories, together with the number of weeks in which there was no history of employment in these years, was recorded. The record of unemployment thus obtained excludes periods of sickness but includes waiting days. It may be affected by errors in the records of the precise length of unemployment. An inde-

pendent estimate based upon the number of days insurance

order to check the results of the first. This estimate was made in the same way as the other, and although it does not include periods when unemployment assistance was received, the two measures taken together probably give a fair estimate of the relative incidence of unemployment at the various stages.

The figures show that the amount of unemployment was less immediately after migration than it was before, but greater than in the period two years after moving. Since records of births were more complete when the claimants were unemployed than when they were employed, the fertility of the period immediately after migration may not have been so much below that of the period before migration as is indicated by Table VIII. But, on the other hand, it was probably more below that of the period over two years after migration. Thus we conclude that in relation to the latter period at least the fertility of the migrants was extremely low during the two years immediately following movement.

There are several considerations which may explain the low fertility of migrants at, and immediately after, the time of migration compared with their fertility after they had settled down. At the time of migration their wages were still not very high and, as mentioned previously, the time was probably one of considerable insecurity because of the difficulty in settling down to the new occupation which migration usually entailed.¹

As Table XI shows, the amount of unemployment at this time, although less than it was before migration, was much more than in the period over two years after migration.

A factor which might have made the migrant loth to increase the size of his family at this time was the difficulty

Only 15 of the 60 men interviewed were married at the time of migration, and this number is too small to make the differences significant. The average weekly pay packets for the 15 men before migration, immediately after migration, and in 1937, were 49, 52, and 63 shillings per week respectively. If we consider the total of single and married migrants, we find a similar gradual improvement in wages, and the differences between the three periods are significant.

TABLE IX

Amount of Unemployment at Different Stages in the History of the Married Oxford Welshmen

(Expressed as percentages of amount in the two years after migration)

| | Period before Migration. | Period 2 years after Migration. | Period over 2 years after Migration. |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| Based on: 1. Employment history | 114 | 100 | 77 |
| 2. Number of days insurance bene- fit received. | 125 | 100 | 60 |

in securing suitable housing accommodation. The men interviewed in Oxford found it hard to obtain houses, and a great many had to be satisfied with small overcrowded temporary accommodation for quite considerable periods.

Another factor tending to reduce fertility immediately after migration was, no doubt, the actual separation of a great many husbands and wives, sometimes for quite considerable periods; the husband seeking work and a suitable house while his wife and the rest of the family remained at home. The Industrial Transference Scheme tends to encourage separation by providing a free grant for lodging allowance while the worker is seeking accommodation for his family. The grant is to enable him to maintain two households, and it may be paid for as many as twenty-six weeks.

Finally, it seems that this time was for most of the migrants a time of social disequilibrium when, having left their friends and relatives behind in Wales, they had to readjust themselves to new surroundings, strange neighbours, and different ways of living. At such a time, when they had no relatives near at hand to help them, and when they were uncertain whether the following year would find them still in Oxford or back in Wales, or perhaps in another strange town, it is not surprising that their fertility was low. Later, when wages were higher, prospects of employment better, and the families were more settled in their new home, their fertility increased.

6. SUMMARY

1. Migration could affect birth-rates by selecting migrants of a given age or marital condition, or by selecting people who at any age were very fertile or very sterile. It could also affect fertility by transferring people from one environment to another more or less favourable to the bearing of children, or by the circumstances attending the actual movement. The selective tendencies could only affect local birth-rates, the other effects could alter the fertility of the whole population.

2. No studies appear to have been made of any of these issues, possibly because there are no published data which can be utilized. In particular, the Census data give only

net migration and cannot be used satisfactorily.

3. Some light can be thrown by the claim-unit documents of the employment exchanges, which give, for insured persons who have claimed insurance benefit, details of their industrial and marital history. But the fact that only those dependants are recorded for whom benefit or assistance has

been claimed makes the analysis difficult.

4. By making various corrections, considering variations in the factors which could cause bias, and making comparisons with control populations, it is believed that these difficulties have been overcome in the present study. It must be stressed, however, that the conclusions suggested by this study are to be regarded as tentative only. They emerge from a preliminary study made in an unexplored field, and they are based upon refractory and hitherto unused material.

5. In the case of the men who first entered insured industry in Wales, and whose claim units were in Oxford in December 1937, migration tended to affect local birth-rates both by selecting persons at young adult ages and also by selecting single rather than married persons.1

6. The excess of single men among the Welsh migrants was

¹ Some of the evidence for this concluson is given in "Labour Migration and Age Composition," loc. cit.

quickly reduced after migration by the rapidity with which they married. The reasons for the migrants' high rate of marriage after migration, a rate which was higher than that for both the native populations, may have been the improvement in their economic position (after an initial period of insecurity), and the importance of marriage as a means of adjustment to a strange environment. There is no evidence that marriage was delayed or prevented by a shortage of eligible women.

7. There is no definite evidence that migration affected age at marriage or the difference in age between husband and wife.

8. There is no evidence that the total fertility of the married migrants differed from that of the population of origin (the Welsh Natives). On the other hand, the fertility of the two Welsh populations (migrant and non-migrant) appears to have been less than that of the Oxford Natives. There are also clear differences between the migrants and the native populations in the pattern of fertility in relation to age.

9. The Oxford Welshmen had a relatively high fertility at ages over 41, which was due perhaps to the migration rather late in life of men with large families; the explanation of this may lie in the special facilities afforded by the Industrial Transference Scheme and by the employment opportunities

for juveniles and young persons in Oxford.

10. The migrants are also found to have had a signicantly lower fertility in the years immediately following movement than at other periods in their history. This fall in fertility may have been due to the economic insecurity and the mental and social disturbances which immediately resulted from transference to a strange environment, and also to the temporary separation of husband and wife. The data is not sufficiently accurate to show whether the fall was balanced by an increased fertility in later years. If it was not so compensated, then it appears that migration of the Oxford Welshmen resulted in a lowering of their total fertility.

SOME EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIETY

By GLADYS BRYSON

THE twentieth century has not yet seen the resolution of the difficulties involved in the use of the concept society and the concepts related to it. Almost any text-book reveals the consciousness of diversity of usage when it offers definitions of the terms society, a society, societal, social, cultural, association, and group. In sociology, as Eubank has pointed out, "the tendency is more and more to use society simply as a broad but convenient name when referring to the associational relationships among men in general, and in specific connections to make use of the more sharply definable concept, viz. the group." Particularly since the emergence of the Simmel-Wiese point of view, there is a growing consensus that if

society is assumed to be something substantive, substantial and spatially demarcable, there can be no doubt that in this sense it is never and nowhere existent; there is no such thing. Society as a concept is acceptable only when it is explicitly stated that it is a completely *verbal* concept, a happening, a process; there is only *sociation*.... The reality which must be substituted for the fictitious substance "society" is merely the sum of those occurrences which have elsewhere been termed social processes.²

What is clear is that we are in a transition stage in our conceptualizing process, not only with respect to this one term but to many of the terms in use in the field and even with respect to the field itself.

The eighteenth century also was a transitional era, largely because in that period effort was made to transfer the

^a Wiese-Becker, Systematic Sociology (New York, 1932), p. 78.

¹ Earle Edward Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology* (Boston, 1932), pp. 131-132. Another convenient list of definitions may be found in Wilson D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1927), ch. 13.

methods and findings of the achievements of natural science in the seventeenth century to a new science of man. The lauded empirical methods of Bacon, Newton, and Lockethe authors usually mentioned-reinforced by some of the achievements of Descartes and Hobbes, who were not so much admired, resulted, in the case of many eighteenthcentury analysts, in a decidedly individualistic psychology and an individualistic, atomistic account of society. Such interpretations were, however, not only the result of the effort to be empirical and find an experimental base line; they were in a sense one of the heritages of the Renaissance and Reformation, and, more concretely, a by-product of a developing nationalism and the concomitant attention to the private rights of individuals under the State. The whole cast of discussion called Natural Jurisprudence was that of an individualistic conception of life. Under that system of thought men conceived of themselves as separate integers, each fully equipped to live his life and to project his impulses into the making, de novo, of social institutions. On the practical side, there was for Englishmen the Revolution of 1688 which, with the help of Locke, they represented to themselves as being a perfect example of independent individuals consolidating their interests, reserving certain of their original rights, contracting with each other to erect and maintain a certain kind of life. The compact thus assumed a crucial place in the social theory of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, since it was the logic, if not the event, by which men accounted for organized life.

And yet, with such a pattern of thought everywhere accepted, society ceased to be treated as an artificial creation; instead, it came to be called a natural relation, and was proved so by the dependence of babes and the fact of organized life among the simplest people yet discovered. Atomistic individualism did not completely disappear; it remained particularly in the accounts of human nature, and yet the emphasis on groups rather than individuals became

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so marked that not a few historians of social theory are now saving that in that generation, particularly in Adam Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society, we climbed to the first step of sociological knowledge. It need not be pointed out that there was as yet no analysis of group composition, group functioning, or group processes. What writers were concerned to emphasize was the fact of the social nature of man and their belief that primordial life must have been group life. As James Dunbar put it, society was not "the sickly daughter of calamity, nor even the production of an aspiring understanding, but the free and legitimate offspring of the human heart"; and Adam Ferguson, "both the earliest and latest accounts collected from every quarter of the earth, represent mankind as assembled in troops and companies," and this fact "must be admitted as the foundation of our reasoning relative to man."1

Society, however, was so extremely difficult to encompass intellectually, to conceptualize satisfactorily, that several alternative discussions were found. One was to enumerate the advantages and corresponding responsibilities brought by social life; here the writers waxed eloquent on the subject of defence, division of labour with its accompaniment of increased wealth and improved technology, the achievement and conservation of culture, and elegance and progress of all kinds. Another alternative was to identify society with political organization, the kind of society they knew best, and to enlarge on its values. Citizenship was highly prized in this century, and the advantages of that status were favourably compared with the conditions prevailing in societies dominated by familial ties. On their theory of progress it was easy to hold that political society was the inevitable form of organization to be achieved by even the simplest peoples,

¹ Dunbar, Essays on the History of Mankind in Rude and Cultivated Ages (2nd ed., London, 1781), p. 17; Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society (8th ed., Philadelphia, 1819), pp. 4-5, 10, 28-29.

since already so many advanced peoples of the world were enjoying it. Under this conception, political organization would be viewed as a matured condition for all human groups, a natural condition to be arrived at in time, and easily to be taken, therefore, as the normal expression of society at it best; it represented, in the words of Thomas Rutherforth, "a complete or perfect society." A third way out of the conceptual difficulty was offered. Why not speak of the advantages of society, its necessity, its widespreadness as a phenomenon, in metaphorical terms if need be, and then pass on to the elements of its structure, the atoms which together make up the undefinable product? And so we find in the literature discussions of the family, of education, of religion, of economic, juridical, and political institutions. In two ways they manifest the older atomic psychology of individualism: the institutions are, from one point of view, products of the propensities of individuals, considered as fairly direct projections of those instincts and needs; from another point of view, they themselves are the atomistic items of a whole structure which is larger than themselves, and description of them is allowed to suffice for a description of that whole.

Now certainly it cannot be said that the authors of the century neglected the concept of relationships for that of structure. The very ethical aims with which most of them began and closed their disquisitions determined for them that relationships, between individuals and between groups, should be kept to the front of their minds. Their concern with the obligations of political life certainly expresses one aspect of the idea of relationship. The relationships evident in exchange of commodities, and in the division of labour which creates a condition in which exchange is possible and profitable, are other aspects frequently dealt with. But relationships were seen almost as if they were static structures; there was little that was mobile, fluctuating, interactional

¹ Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law (Cambridge, 1754), I, 23.

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about them. In other words, the verbal concept of society was just not there.

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To make concrete some of the theories concerning the origin, nature, bonds, and advantages of society, we may turn to a group of philosophers who were regarded as able exponents of the best of the century's thought—the group in Scotland centring about David Hume and Adam Smith. Those two names speak for themselves, but the others of the group were almost as well known in their generation: Francis Hutcheson, Adam Ferguson, Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart. Beyond this group of professors-though Hume, of course, never held the coveted chair-were the two irascible judges, Lord Kames and Lord Monboddo. Indeed, the reputation of this group as a school of philosophy lasted considerably after their century; in the nineteenth they greatly influenced Jouffroy and Cousin in France, and until almost the third quarter of the century their works were the text-books in mental and moral philosophy in most of the colleges of the United States. There is no need to speak of the undiminishing importance of Hume and Smith. Several facts about this circle of philosophers are sufficient to recall at this point: they were men of ability and recognized influence; they were versed in the controversies of the day; they were well read and widely travelled, and, even if they had not travelled, Scottish towns and universities were not at that date provincial nor parochial; finally, they were, including Hume, primarily moral philosophers, and their concern, then, was at all times with the life of man in society. To be a moral philosopher did not mean that one was concerned only with ethics, immediately, and narrowly conceived; it meant that one was concerned with the origin and constitution of man, the origin and functioning of his institutions, the progress man had made and the prospects for his future. And the field of moral philosophy, unevenly though it was cultivated, was, more than any other single field, that from which sprang the various segmental social

sciences of the nineteenth century. It was, to change the figure, a kind of matrix in which lay embedded the simple formulations of psychology, economics, political science, anthropology, jurisprudence, sociology; soon these were to break apart and, with accretions drawn from many other sources, were to become the abstractions known now as the social sciences.¹ In consulting moral philosophers of the eighteenth century we are consulting our own predecessors in the field of the social sciences.

Let us take account first of Francis Hutcheson, earliest of this particular Scottish group. It is interesting to note that the title of his inaugural lecture when he assumed the professorship of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1730 was De Naturali Hominum Socialitate. But society is primordial and natural not only for men, but for animals as well; it is not only pleasurable and convenient, but it is required for the preservation of life and peace. Discussing the necessity for society, he writes: "Whatever appears necessary for preserving an amicable society among men must necessarily be enjoined by the Law of Nature." Even civil society, acknowledged as a later and "adventitious" state, cannot be called unnatural, since men adopt it on using their native intelligence and judging of its superior advantages.

Men must have first observed some dangers or miseries attending a state of anarchy to be much greater than any inconveniences to be feared from submitting their affairs along with others to the direction of certain governors or councils concerned in the safety of all: and then they would begin to desire a political constitution for their own safety and advantage, as well as for the general good.

Common interest, thus, would seem to be the motive for civil government; but candour forces Hutcheson to admit

¹ See the author's papers: "The Emergence of the Social Sciences from Moral Philosophy," International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XLII (April 1932), pp. 304–323; "The Comparable Interests of the Old Moral Philosophy and the Modern Social Sciences," Social Forces, Vol. XI (October 1932), pp. 19–27; "Sociology considered as Moral Philosophy," Sociological Review, Vol. XXIV (January 1932), pp. 26–36.

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that history may have seen some civil governments come into being on no such just and wise motives, but as the result of force and injustice. Whatever the origin, "the constituting of civil power is the most important transaction in worldly affairs. . . ." Hutcheson speaks often of mankind as constituting by nature one great society, a body, a system. Yet there are societies, too. Thus there seems to be a series of systems in a macrocosm: the great society, particular societies, and the individual who is himself a system. The parts are held together by virtue of the plan and purpose of the whole cosmic scheme, effected in the case of man through his social impulses. For the individual is by nature governed by social bonds, and life in society calls out and strengthens in him honour, benevolence, compassion, gaiety, and the moral judgment; these, in turn, serve the good of the whole.

The scene, however, is not unmixed: "the general tenor of human life is an incoherent mixture of many social, kind, innocent actions, and of many selfish, angry, sensual ones; as one or other of our natural dispositions happens to be raised, and to be prevalent over others." But some of the unlovelier aspects really constitute a bond of society. Anger, resentment, and indignation, for example, when not carried to excess, are as necessary for a just and balanced regime as are pure benevolence and generosity. These feelings of anger and resentment are uneasy and unlovely in themselves to the persons experiencing them, but are necessary for the good of the whole. In all these ways the secret chain between a man and mankind is forged. The ideal seems to be a sort of balance between the good of the individual and the good of the whole; or, rather, because the individual is a part of the whole, he becomes the object of his own benevolence when he acts for the good of the whole. Because the happiness and duration of the whole depends on that of the parts, however, the system may exercise certain perfect rights, as Hutcheson calls them, over individuals. For example, the prevention of suicide, the preservation of

the race, the prevention of monstrous lusts, the prevention of destruction of useful things, the prevention and punishment of injuries, the requirement of public use of helpful inventions. the preservation of ideas of the dignity of the race-all of these are society's perfect rights.1

Adam Ferguson, as well as Hutcheson, recognizes all the animosities and the dissensions which occur inevitably when men are in contact, and neither does he, moralist fashion, deplore them. Rather, he sees them as productive of other social values such as a liberal spirit, patriotism, political ability, conservation of property with all the concomitants of that; and he does not deplore the fact that dissensions frequently lead to wars, for out of wars nations are made.2

Hume is one of the earliest and most insistent critics of an individualistic interpretation of society. "Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit." Alone, man is a very inadequate and defective creature, and it is only in society that these weaknesses are compensated and that we achieve force, ability, and security. But man's wisdom did not effect this bond: it came about more or less accidentally, worked out from family circles until after long ages large groups, non-kinship groups, became as concerned with peace and justice as were families. Sex may be said to be a first and original principle of human society. Next come the ties between parents and children which have peculiar potency through infancy and which accustom the children to expect everywhere the same system of co-operation and restraint; moreover, the arrangement works out so that, whatever it be that forms the manners of one generation, the next must imbibe a deeper tincture of the same dye. Individual and community interests become intertwined,

¹ The most pertinent discussions in Hutcheson are to be found in his System of Moral Philosophy (London, 1755), I, 34-35; II, 212-234, 285; Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (5th ed., Philadelphia, 1788), pp. 98, 101, 117, 123, 206-207, 232-235; Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (2nd ed., London, 1726), pp. 121 ff., 173-177, 181.

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but it seems clear to Hume that we do have originally within us a principle of fellow-feeling and a concern for the interests of society apart from our own benefits.

This principle, or propensity, is sympathy, considered not as a virtue but as a principle of communication. We have, says Hume, a "propensity... to receive by communication their [other persons'] inclinations and sentiments, however different from or even contrary to, our own." And, in another context: "So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree." Evidently this is a "powerful and insinuating" principle. The result is "that the minds of men are mirrors to one another..." and men, for the most part, are inclined to the public good.

Another notion of which Hume made considerable use, and which has innumerable sociological implications, is the power of custom. True, as he discusses it he is usually accounting for our mental operations and not for social phenomena, but the implications are there. For example, in writing of the causes of belief, he says we find that

the understanding or imagination can draw inferences from past experience, without reflecting on it; much more without forming any principle concerning it, or reasoning upon that principle.

And in writing on the passions, he says:

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But nothing has a greater effect both to increase and diminish our passions, to convert pleasure into pain, and pain into pleasure, than custom and repetition. Custom has two original effects upon the mind, in bestowing a facility in the performance of any action or the conception of any object; and afterwards a tendency or inclination towards it; and from these we may account for all its other effects, however extraordinary.

This is not far from an anticipation of Sumner's concept of the folkways and the way in which they are made; EE 409

something of the sway of custom Hume knew, and he credited it with much value for the common life.

The "system" or "scheme" of society Hume describes several times and in various figures of speech. It is a vast play of mutual dependence, involving buying and selling, co-operative planning, protection of some by others in return for service of another kind, the use of some people as tools, while the tools in their turn use still other people and devices. It is, as he sees it, a network of reciprocal services. Now all of this involves something more than the simple social impulses of benevolence and humanity; it involves the social virtues of justice and fidelity. These virtues are natural only in the sense that man has, by his intelligence, come to see the need for mutual services if the common need is to be met. It is not that men have ever contracted with one another to work for the common good, but their good sense indicates what it is and, often, a plan for effecting it, just as two rowers " pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest, without promise or contract . . . thus speech, and words, and language, are fixed by human convention and agreement." Individuals come to recognize some common interests and to support certain institutions, customs, and conventions when often their first inclination may be to do otherwise. In this case it is not love of mankind which operates, but a regard for the conventions and systems of relationships which have been established, tacitly or by law, and which have been seen to have useful results.

In all of this system Hume finds that there are degrees in the reciprocity of services. Here he approaches the concept

of social distance:

Whoever is united to us by any connexion is always sure of a share of our love, proportioned to the connexion, without inquiring into his other qualities. Thus the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation lessens. Nor has consanguinity alone this effect, but any other relation

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without exception. We love our countrymen, our neighbours, those of the same trade, profession, and even name with ourselves. Every one of these relations is esteemed some tie, and gives a title to a share of affection.

The advantages of society are peace and order, but chiefly, in Hume, security of property. This security could not come about until after the convention of abstinence from the possessions of others had been established sufficiently for ideas of justice and injustice to arise, and after them the more abstract ideas of property, right, and obligation. After the social system is operating well, it becomes a chief source for the origin of moral ideas as men reflect upon it as a system and on the common interests of all who are dependent on it. Thus the claims of society are met with less reluctance than heretofore, and men become more society-minded.1

To Adam Smith, society is "the peculiar and darling care of Nature," and "justice . . . is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice," while benevolence is merely "the ornament which embellishes the building." It is true that men are naturally sympathetic, but it requires "particular connections" to work fully, and justice is more to be trusted. He reminds us, though, how unwilling we are to punish criminals for the good of society; we punish with more conviction if we know particular persons who have been injured by the criminal.

As with Hume, with Smith, too, sympathy is no virtue such as benevolence; it is a principle of communication, a power of the imagination which allows a person to put himself in another's place, to see the world through that person's eyes, to feel its pressures and rebuffs through his sensitivities. It is a fellow-feeling, but it is not pity nor

¹ These points are made most cogently in the Treatise of Human Understanding (ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1896), pp. 104, 318, 352, 422, 485-493, and Bk. II, Part I, sec. XI; Bk. II, Part II, sections V and XII; Bk. III, Part II, sections I, II; Bk. III, Part III, sections III, V, and VI; Essays (new ed., Green and Grose, London, 1882), I, 113, 248, and II, 403; Principles of Morals (2nd ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1902), pp. 205 ff., 218-219.

compassion, which are words used to signify our fellowfeeling with the sorrow of others; it is a neutral word expressing a very active principle, namely, our participation in any passion whatever of any of our fellows. If we acquire our first notions of our own selves from other persons, and are constantly moulding and remoulding ourselves so as to win their approval, we, in turn, judge of all other persons who come into communication with us. "Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another." Society presents itself to us, then, as a vast network of interstimulation and response. Individuals are greatly controlled by the wishes and judgments of their fellows. Indeed, there seem to be no individuals here, so organic is the relation of person to person pictured. Even the phenomenon of natural affection, as seen between parents and children, turns out to be habitual sympathy.

One of Smith's analyses which follows Hume and which sounds like a page out of Charles Horton Cooley or any social psychologist influenced by him, is that of society as a mirror into which we look. Speaking of the dire condition of a person brought up in isolation without communication, he says:

Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind. . . . This is the only looking glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.¹

For Adam Ferguson the fact of society is one never to be called into question. In his "elegant" moods he writes of the atmosphere of society as

¹ Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. I of ed. of Works (London, 1812), pp. 131-156, 188-194, 413-417, and Part I, sec. I, chs. I-4 incl.; Wealth of Nations, Everyman ed., pp. 12-15.

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the element in which the human mind must draw the first breath of intelligence itself; or if not the vital air by which the celestial fire of moral sentiment is kindled: we cannot doubt but it is of mighty effect in exciting the flame; and that the minds of men, to use a familiar example, may be compared to those blocks of fuel which taken apart are hardly to be lighted: but if gathered . . . are easily kindled into a blaze.

And, still more elegantly,

Society . . . may be considered as the garden of God, in which the tree of knowledge of good and evil is planted; and in which men are destined to distinguish, and to choose, among its fruits.

More realistically he writes, "Mankind have always wandered or settled, agreed or quarrelled, in troops and companies." Man is "a man in every condition" and "with him society appears as old as the individual, and the use of the tongue as universal as that of the hand or the foot." And, as if to settle the matter, he quotes from Montesquieu, whom he so much admired, "Man is born in society, and there he remains."

Now certainly this is no nominalism with reference to society, but a genuine, almost a passionate, insistence on its reality. The picture Ferguson presents throughout his writings is not that of an artificial grouping of individuals who behave artificially toward each other, mechanically, spiritlessly. Nor are his individuals motivated by selfinterest or benevolence exclusively. What he presents is a description of group life which has existed from primordial time, in which all human motivations and relationships are lived out. Man lives in society because he always has lived in it, and must continue to live in it. The seeds of it are in his nature: in his propensity for alliance and union which man everywhere displays; in his propensity for dissension-"our species is disposed to opposition as well as to concert"; and in his propensity to preserve himself. The latter propensity gives "rise to his apprehensions on the subject

of property"; and while man has no such specific instinct toward property as beavers, squirrels, ants, and bees have for accumulating their little hoards for winter, inadvertently he becomes, "in process of time, the great storemaster among animals."

He takes account of convention in these words:

Convention, though not the foundation or cause of society... may be supposed almost coeval with the intercourse of mankind. Men do not move in the same company together, without communications of mind or intention. These communications become objects of mutual reliance, and even that party may be charged with breach of faith who has belied the expectations he gave by his amicable looks or pacific behaviour. From the first steps, therefore, that are made in society, conventions may be supposed to go on accumulating in the form of practice, if not in the form of statute or express institution.

Though the fact of man's being in society is rooted in his nature, there are many charms, as Ferguson calls them, which hold him to this union. With man, the affection for parents does not die when the offspring are old enough to shift for themselves, but lasts on, mixed with gratitude and memory, and the pleasure of shared experiences. The pleasures and advantages of comradeship, the cheerfulness of company, are to be weighed against the sadness and melancholy of solitude. But even such bonds

are of a feeble texture, when compared to the resolute ardour with which a man adheres to his friend, or to his tribe, after they have for some time run the career of fortune together. Mutual discoveries of generosity, joint trials of fortitude, redouble the ardours of friendship, and kindle a flame in the human breast, which the considerations of personal interest or safety cannot suppress.

Then there is the affection which grows up from "mere acquaintance and habitude," and there are all those situations which make a man forget his own individual concerns and act more freely and more vigorously than he

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knew he had it in him to do. All of these factors, apart from any reckoning of advantages and conveniences, hold man in society.

The roots of society are in man, and man would not be man but for his life in society. "Send him to the desert alone, he is a plant torn from his roots; the form indeed may remain, but every facility droops and withers; the human personage and the human character cease to exist."

Buddeberg's judgment of Ferguson's notion of society is very fair. He points out that Ferguson had clearly seen the difference

zwischen einer rein äusserlichen, summarischen Anhäufung von Einzelmenschen und der "Gruppe " als einer neuen soziologischen Einheit. . . . Die Gruppe ist nach Ferguson ein soziologisches Eigengebilde von besonderer Struktur. Sie ist ein ursprüngliche Verbundensein, das "mit der Natur des Menschen" gegeben ist; sie ist ein emotionales Gebilde, beherrscht und zusammen gehalten von den "Banden des Gefühls." Die Grüppe wurzelt, wie Ferguson hervorhebt, nicht in den Schichten des Bewussten, der Zwecke und Interessen, sondern in der Welt irrationaler Motive.

On the subject of society Reid and Stewart are not so worthy of note as on some other discussions. Reid offers an "elegant" analogy when he writes,

Human society may be compared to a group of embers, which when placed asunder, can retain neither their light nor heat, amidst the surrounding elements; but when brought together, they mutually give heat and light to each other; the flame breaks forth, and not only defends itself, but subdues everything around it.

He makes much more of benevolence than do Smith and Hume, and he is sure that all the security, happiness, and strength of human society spring solely from reciprocal

Heft 123 (Jena, 1925), p. 627.

¹ Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 4-5, 10, 28-29, and all of Part I, sec. III; Principles of Moral and Political Science (Edinburgh, 1792), I, 18-20, 24, 30-31, 37, 268-269, and all of Part I, ch. I, sec. 3; II, 232; Institutes of Moral Philosophy (2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1773), pp. 85-90.

² Theodor Buddeberg, "Ferguson als Soziologe," in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie,

benevolence. He criticizes Smith, particularly, for his doctrine of sympathy as possible without benevolent affections. In this position he is much more particularistic than his two friends and much less realistic than they and Ferguson.1 Dugald Stewart is one of those whose thought constantly seems to play between political organization and society without ever coming to a focus for distinction. We are somewhat surprised to find, for example, that when he undertakes a discussion of man as a member of a political body he proceeds to a treatment of marriage and the character of the sexes, property, the arts and sciencesitems we scarcely regard as political, but which for him make up the "history" of political society. True, private property, except in possessions such as clothing and tools, is seldom recognized among non-political peoples, and primitive conditions of life do not call for an elaboration of the arts and sciences. The inference would seem to be that, for Stewart, political society was the only kind worthy of analysis. But he, too, can be "elegant" and write that we were made for society

by the same comprehending wisdom which adapts the fin of the fish to the water, and the wing of the bird to the air, and which scatters the seeds of the vegetable tribes in those soils and exposures where they are fitted to vegetate.

Even the principles of political union may be said to be universal and essential principles of our human constitution, since "man . . . excepting in his rudest state, has always been found connected with a political community."²

When we come to the two judges in this group of friends and philosophers, we meet some variations on the usual themes. True, Lord Kames says all that is expected on the appetite which man has for society, on the benefits of it

¹ Reid, Works (6th ed., by Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1863), I, 244-245; II, 565-566, 641, 663-670.

² Stewart, Collected Works (ed. by Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1854-1860), II, 11; VI, 135-142; VIII, 20-29, and Part III of the "Outlines of Moral Philosophy."

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and the conflicts within it. He makes a good deal of the point that man's capacity is limited, that his affections lessen gradually in proportion to the distance of the object, so that his family and friends come first and other groups command less and less of his good will.

But here comes in a happy contrivance of nature . . . which is to give power to an abstract term, such as our religion, our country, our government, or even mankind, to raise benevolence or public spirit in the mind. The particular objects under each of these classes, considered singly and apart, may have little or no force to produce affection; but when comprehended under one general term, they become an object that dilates and warms the heart. . . .

The facet of Kames' discussion which is new is his attention to animal society. Others had made casual references and apt analogies, but Kames was genuinely interested in the thought that "the social laws by which . . . animals are governed, might open views into the social nature of man," and he was disappointed to find little discussion of animal society in the literature of natural history. To meet the need somewhat he puts together, then, "a few dry facts," "the fruit of casual observation"; he was eager as always, "to blow the trumpet, in order to raise curiosity in others." Thus he may, without too much stretching of the interpretation on our part, be thought of as anticipating somewhat the discussions of Wheeler, Alverdes, Yerkes, Zuckerman, of our day.

He makes clear that not all animals are found in society: wolves, vultures, lions, tigers, bears—the animals of prey—have no appetite for it. Though they frequently unite for an attack on man or animal, the objective is food and not the company of their kind. It is mostly the harmless animals that show the appetite for society, and the appetite serves them well by strengthening their defence and facilitating the procuring of necessities. Sheep, swine, beavers, bees, and baboons are among the animals to

which society seems necessary. Other animals live in society for no other reason, apparently, than the pleasure it gives them. Horses afford an example of this imperfect society—imperfect because it is not provided by nature for defence or food-getting—and nothing, says Kames, is "more common in a moon-light night than to see hares sporting together in the most social manner." After this little pastoral touch, he goes on to discuss whether some animals do not really show some proclivities for even civil society. He speaks of the sentinels among monkeys, beavers, seals, and elephants; of the monarchical organization of apes and the horned cattle, of the republican form of government among herons and rooks. However simple or complex animal government appears, it is

perfect in its kind; and adapted with great propriety to their nature. Factions in the state are unknown; no enmity between individuals, no treachery, no deceit, nor any other of those horrid vices that torment the human race. In a word, they appear to be perfectly well qualified for that kind of society to which they are prompted by their nature; and well fitted for being happy in it.

In one of the stories illustrating his points in this discussion Kames would seem to be set to rival Monboddo and his delightful orang-outangs. He is commenting on the misunderstood nature of sheep—and M. Buffon, no less, was among those in error—and insisting that they have a sort of military instinct and can very well defend themselves. He then tells the story of a very soldierly ram:

A ram, educated by a soldier, accompanied his master to the battle of Culloden. When a cannon was fired, it rejoiced and ran up to it. It actually began the battle, advancing before the troops, and attacking some dogs of the highland army.

Bleating, we suppose, "Pro Patria!"1

¹ Kames, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751), pp. 82–86, 127–128; Sketches of the History of Man (Edinburgh, 1774), Vol. I, Bk. II, sketch I, esp. p. 356.

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Lord Monboddo we should expect to stand out of line with his contemporaries in his thought about society as he does in his thought about everything else. It was he who convulsed his generation by writing enthusiastically and persistently about the orang-outangs as men, men with tails, who, though in such an "infantine" state within the species, yet had so many of the virtues and graces of civilized men. When he discusses society, he agrees with his fellows that it is necessary, but he will have none of the popular talk that it is a state natural to man. Grotius was wrong when he taught that man was by nature not only rational but political. The truth is that it is only man's intelligence, not his inclination, which has led him to form social groupings, and he formed them for sustenance and defence. Man as an animal was at first entirely solitary; man as we know him to-day is both solitary and gregarious.

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Man participates so much of the gregarious animal as to have no aversion to the society of his fellow-creatures, far less to be the natural enemy of his own species, as certain species are of others; and . . . he also has so much of the nature of the solitary wild beast, that he has no natural propensity to enter into society.

And then he goes on to say, "What, among other things, induces me to think he is of this mixt kind, is the formation of his teeth and intestines."

Since man is "this mixt kind," his society would probably be somewhat "mixt" too. And so Monboddo views it: bad for the best of the animal in man, but necessary for the cultivation of man as a being of mind. He may argue that society is unnatural, but he does have to grant that it is by means of it, the civil form of it, that man has been restoring himself to the approximation of his original status, to the recapturing of all those arts and sciences he lost as a result of his intellectual sin and fall. Particularly, he emphasizes that language could never have been invented if civil society had not been first in existence. In this

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position he consciously follows Rousseau; but unlike Rousseau he does not believe that language is necessary for the continuance of society.

It is not pure gain, by any means, however. It may be well, metaphysically, that man by becoming civil becomes at the same time a microcosm within the macrocosm of the great system animated by Mind; but civil society presents many difficulties:

In this state, every man has within his clothes a little kingdom, but which is not easily governed; for in civil society they [sic] are so many wants and desires, and so many opportunities, which the civil life furnishes of gratifying those desires, that our intellectual mind, or governing Principle, is very often led astray. . . .

Consequently, civil life leads to many weaknesses and perversions, and tends to exaggerate the desirableness of ease, convenience, and pleasure, with their train of moneymadness, war, and depopulation. So, though it has offered necessary means of rehabilitating man as man, and though in it man has made wonderful progress, Monboddo is glad that the teachings of the classics and the Scriptures point to a cataclysmic ending of the life of man on earth and to a brighter future in the epoch of the new heaven and the new earth.¹

It must have become apparent from the discussion offered here that society was not conceived very exactly by these philosophers. Civil society meant for them the political state in some form, but society, without the adjective civil, meant variously, as Professor Lehmann has pointed out for Ferguson, any kind of group, any association serving a purpose, or any collectivity as contrasted with a single individual.² Of one thing they are sure: society was both

W. C. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology (New York, 1930), pp. 153-156.

¹ Monboddo, Origin of Language (Edinburgh, 1773-1792), I, p. 223, and Bk. II, chs. 1, 2, 8-10, and 12-13 inclusive; Antient Metaphysics (Edinburgh, 1772-1799), V, 9-10, 88-94 and passim; VI, 146, 191. The page cited in the Origin of Language is to a 2nd edition of Vol. I, which appeared with Vol. II in 1774.

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real and functional, had existed as long as there had been men, and was a maker of men. Buddeberg's judgment of Ferguson's theory applies to the conception of all of these writers: "Nicht das Individuum, sondern die Gemeinschaft' ist...der Träger der Kultur und die Geschichte."

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By those who were interested in the functions of the political state—and most of them were—there was considerable anticipation of Tönnies' concepts, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Whereas Gemeinschaft, community, is seen by Tönnies as a product of nature and propensity, of kinship and necessity, characterized by a common will, dominance of community interests and common property, Gesellschaft, society, is seen as an artificial mechanism, in which individual interests predominate and the solidarity of the group is achieved by contractual relations, both juridical and These eighteenth-century authors are not concerned to labour the distinction, but it is there implied, and brought into the open when they stress, for example, the division of labour which characterizes advanced, political societies. Nor do they wish to stress the artificiality of the advanced state, since they are concerned to show that all of man's development is natural, to be expected in the course of time, given man's propensities to meet varying situations and to progress. In their anticipation of Tönnies' concepts they simply saw a not very complex kinship group giving way to a larger, more complex group which was required in the later conditions of life, dominated by political bonds rather than blood bonds, and by the reciprocity of economic services required in such a complex organization. But much of the same feeling of the older Gemeinschaft carries over into the Gesellschaft, especially in small groups and small communities; in more senses than the historical, then, the former represents for them the basic social form.

1 Op. cit., p. 627.

By JULIUS KLANFER

THE attitude of democratic governments and of democratic political parties towards the phenomenon of anti-democratic propaganda is generally determined by two considerations. There is, first, a strong conviction that freedom of propaganda is essential to democracy, that a democratic government is one under which the will of the State is determined by a choice made by its citizens between different groups; each group proposes its own particular programme and solicits in open competition and by means of propaganda the consent of the public. The second argument is that which states that the freedom of propaganda granted to the adversaries of democracy has resulted in the destruction of democracy in Germany and Austria, has largely contributed to its undermining in Czechoslovakia, and perhaps, within a short time, will lead to a vital crisis in other countries.

It is difficult for those who defend democracy to harmonize the thesis which argues that democracy, by its very definition, is the rule of freedom of propaganda with the thesis which states that freedom of anti-democratic propaganda results in the destruction of democracy. There is, of course, no logical contradiction between these two arguments. But if both are true, if democracy cannot exist without tolerating a propaganda which will result inevitably in the abolition of democracy, then it is obvious that this form of government is condemned to disappear in a future more or less remote.

That is the conclusion drawn by the adherents of totalitarian systems. According to their arguments, a kind of dialectic evolution leads from democracy to some authoritarian government, such as individual dictatorship. Thus, the suppression of individual freedom appears to be progressive and necessary while the maintenance of free insti-

tutions seems reactionary, i.e. opposed to the "natural" development of humanity.

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As sociologists, concerned more with the statement and explanation of facts than with their moral appreciation, we have to consider whether or not free propaganda brings about the destruction of democracy. With this purpose in mind, we shall first try to obtain a more precise knowledge of the social phenomenon called propaganda, of the means by which propaganda influences the political evolution of society, and of the laws and customs which limit the action of propaganda even in a democratic State. Secondly, we shall consider the means by which a democratic government can prevent the destroying effects of propaganda without abandoning democratic methods and democratic principles. Our investigations may well result in showing that, under certain conditions, democracy is unable to defend itself against anti-democratic principles. A third question will then arise: what maximum of democratic principles can be saved when democratic parties and democratic governments are obliged to fight against hostile propaganda? Further, to what extent can propaganda be of service to democracy in its struggle against totalitarian movements?

In order to arrive at a better understanding of the social function of propaganda, we shall now consider a realm in which this phenomenon is more isolated and less confused with other activities than it is in political life—the realm of commercial propaganda, i.e. of advertising. The business of the advertiser is to persuade people to do something: for instance, to buy certain goods, or to buy in a certain shop rather than in any other—something they would probably not do if they were not influenced by his advertisement. There is propaganda in favour of some particular brand of goods, or in a more general way in favour of a certain kind of consumption; thus we have propaganda in favour of drinking milk, of giving books as Christmas presents, or of dwelling in one's own house rather than in one that has

been rented. On the other hand, there is no propaganda made in favour of wearing clothes and shoes, of protecting oneself against cold, or of sending children to school: for in these cases everyone is obliged to do so by custom, personal interest, and law. The aim of propaganda is to drive people to perform acts which they are free either to do or not to do.

The political propaganda in democratic States is usually of somewhat the same pattern. It is an attempt to make people behave in a certain way: and so for example one is influenced to elect a certain member to Parliament, or to become a member of some political party, or to read one newspaper rather than any other. In all these acts the individual has

perfect freedom, the final decision rests with him.

The freedom of the individual who is approached, the attempt to obtain his consent, his voluntary contribution, these are the distinctive features of propaganda. There are also other ways of making a man behave in a particular way: there are laws and police regulations, military commands, the punishment of criminals, all of which are influences acting upon the members of civilized societies. But their purpose is not so much to bring about consent as to bring about obedience: they do not presume the freedom of the individual but they rather use the personality as an object, as a means towards an end which, from the individual's point of view, is arbitrary.

It may be objected that those who enjoy freedom are also submitted to other influences whose purpose is to favour the interest of those concerned. When a government encourages the creation of national industries by subventions, or when particularly high wages are granted to certain categories of workers, in order to interest young people in these occupations, when a new shop attracts customers by extraordinarily low prices, then of course they appeal to the personal judgment of men. But in those cases the individuals are presumed to be free only from constraint

or from oppression. They are not considered as free even in regard to immediate impulses. The presumption made in these cases is that men, as animals, when making a decision, follow in a mechanical way a simple pattern of behaviour, that they are driven by some instinct to earn as much money as possible. All other human interests, such as having a professional occupation which gives satisfaction, or in buying according to one's taste and not merely according to price-conditions, are completely neglected. Propaganda, on the other hand, never appeals to one kind of desire only: it generally tries to point out that complete satisfaction of the various desires will rise from the particular action (consumption) which is proposed. It appeals to the total personality and not to one impulse considered as strong

enough to overpower the personality.

In the field of education, the methods employed and the purpose for which they are employed bear some similarity to those which characterize propaganda. It is the wish of the educator to bring about consent, to interest the child's personality in a certain behaviour, and not-unless he is a bad educator-to make the child obey mechanically by habit or by fear. He does so in the child's own interest. But, nevertheless, it is obvious that education aims at the conservation and development of civilization and has no respect whatsoever for those individual desires which do not conform to the demands of society. The child's personality is the object and the material of education. It is possible for the modern educator to avoid using violence in his treatment of his pupils; but he is able to do so only because the world in which the child lives is sufficiently difficult, and even violent, to prevent it from behaving anti-socially. No educator would tolerate criminal desires, but there is generally no need for him to struggle against them: there are other factors in society which suffice to exercise the necessary suppression. The child may have to submit to the contempt of his fellows, or he may lose the love and

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protection of his parents or of other powerful adults. Moreover, considerable restraint is exercised even in the freest education. By placing a child in a world adapted to the needs of civilized society (a world which at the same time may be adapted also to the child's power of assimilation, as, e.g. that of the Montessori School), education limits the freedom of personal action and leads the development of the individual in a direction determined by the needs of society. The individual is thus submitted to a social discipline which may take the form of self-government but nevertheless contains an obligation imposed on the individual independent of his consent.

From this preliminary analysis it appears that propaganda is that particular kind of influence exercised upon men which assumes that these men are free to behave in the way that has been proposed, as well as in any other way. The sense of "freedom," in this definition, is that of freedom of the personality, i.e. freedom not only from constraint but also from the overwhelming power of those strong impulses which drive men at a certain moment to acts which normally they would consider as strange, as not belonging to their

personality.

This definition seems to be in flagrant contradiction to the well-known fact that the amount of propaganda used by dictatorial governments is considerably greater than the entire propaganda made by democratic parties in those States which grant to their citizens the largest personal freedom. This dictatorial propaganda, however, is undertaken to encourage those actions, thoughts, or feelings which even a totalitarian government is unable to impose upon its subjects; and so they are encouraged to believe in the perfection of the dictator and his politics, to be enthusiastic about the present state of things, to hate and persecute the adversaries of the regime and the members of certain nations, races, and churches, and to have a certain attitude towards religion which the government, for various reasons, is unable

or unwilling to impose. It must also be realized that dictatorial propaganda is generally conducted in a way which, as we shall see later, is at the extreme limit of what may be called propaganda as we have defined it above, and as we shall consider it in the following paragraphs.

In analysing the methods by which propaganda influences society, we do not intend to give a description of the technical means used by propagandists, but rather to study the social and psychological reactions resulting from their efforts.

The first statement we want to make is that propaganda never has a direct effect upon social evolution, such as a war, a revolution, or an economic event may have, but only prepares the way for these events by causing certain mass-The mass, following the impulse created by propaganda, erects or destroys the power of some party or personality, makes revolutions, constrains governments to make peace or war, influences legislation, follows some political or religious leader and abandons others. Propaganda is always addressed to a mass, more or less large-and important. This mass is composed of individuals, whatever may be the difference between the individual's normal behaviour and his behaviour under the influence of the mass; and though the effect of the mass action differs in quantity and quality from the sum of the effect of all the actions of its isolated members, any attempt to influence the mass presumes an influence upon the individuals. Yet it is unnecessary to rouse directly in each person belonging to the mass all the feelings, thoughts, and volitions which propaganda wishes to inculcate in the mass as a whole. Once a certain number of people are profoundly influenced by propaganda, their acts, their speech and example creates an entirely new situation in which even those who have not been directly touched by propaganda follow the movement of the leaders whether they in be the majorty or in the minority. Thus it is obvious that the first and immediate result of propaganda is the influence it has on a certain

number of individuals, and the change it brings about in their behaviour.

The individual addressed by propaganda is to be considered as a personality with a hierarchy of moral, æsthetic, intellectual, economic, religious, political, and other values: he has his preferences and his dislikes, beliefs and doubts; he has a positive or negative appreciation of the men, things, and ideas with which he comes in contact, and he has, too, all the feelings, hopes, and fears which education and previous experience have taught him to accept. The personality controls his actions and even his thoughts and There are feelings which he considers as bad, as not allowed, as incompatible with moral principles, feelings such as fear and hatred aroused in certain circumstances. In the same way certain thoughts, such as a doubt about the truth of religion, may perhaps be prohibited in his mind. A personality is not passive material which may be shaped at will by any influence, as water and temperature act upon the forms of mountains: on the contrary, it makes a severe selection, admitting some influences and rejecting those which are opposed to the values already adopted.

Propaganda in its pure form, that is to say when it tries to get consent, has to respect the personality. No advertiser, of course, would dare to rouse feelings or thoughts which social morality thinks inferior and the public display of which it does not tolerate, such as, for instance, strong erotic feelings. Not only would the police and law courts use sanctions against him, but also the public itself would refuse to sympathize with a firm whose advertising is incompatible with the moral or æsthetic standard of the society. The usual political propaganda in democratic States also avoids methods which would shock persons whose moral standard is not much higher than the average standard of the public. It aims at showing individuals that the politics of a certain party or the election of a certain person is in conformity with their interests, and promises satisfaction to their desires.

These desires are generally approved by the personality. They are legitimate, civilized desires, in accordance with the hierarchy of values adopted by the individual. We may call such propaganda "conservative" since it conserves the personal and social standard and points out that the proposed action is the logical consequence of the ideas, wants, and moral and æsthetic judgments which constitute the personality.

In extreme opposition to this kind of propaganda, we have what we may call "destructive" propaganda: this is an attempt to destroy the personality in order to make the individual behave in a way which the integral personality

would never admit.

The possibility of destroying the hierarchy of values built up by an individual arises from the fact that the personality is the result of social influences which are imposed upon the child and, later on, upon the adult, by violence and suppression. It would lead us too far afield to discuss here the human individual's primary equipment of dispositions, the nature and structure of those dispositions, the way in which experience transforms their activity, and the stimuli which arouse them to action. For the problem with which we are concerned, it is of little importance whether the innate dispositions called "instincts" contain only the tendency to transform a certain primary situation into a certain other (final) situation, as is assumed by W. McDougall, or whether they contain also a definite pattern of behaviour, a "mechanism" by which the final stage is brought about. Nor is the understanding of the transformation and suppression of these dispositions dependent on whether we suppose that there is a fundamental difference between the kinds of dispositions called "reflexes," "drives," and "instincts," or whether we consider them as distinguished only by their various degrees of rigidity, as, for instance, Thorndike does. It suffices, for our purpose, to state that the suppression of a disposition is never complete, that there remains the possibility of follow-

ing the primary pattern of action—which, normally, is suppressed—and that in those cases where the control of behaviour by the personality is ineffective, the individual's action may, of course, turn back to those "prohibited" modes of behaviour. This situation arises when the personality is faced with feelings of extraordinary strength, with privations, with distress, so violent that the normally admitted behaviour is unable to lead to any satisfaction, to a diminution of the unbearable organic tension. The phenomenon stated by psycho-analysts and called "regression" is one example of this lowering of the standard of behaviour.

Politicians desiring to bring about behaviour which the personality of civilized men never would admit have the chance to succeed by destroying the whole organization of dispositions, the hierarchy of values which determines the action of the individual. For this purpose, they create violent passions, hope and fear, boundless hatred against adversaries or against a particular group of men, e.g. Jews, or foreigners; they prefer particular physical conditions, such as the presence of crowds, to facilitate the overwhelming of the personality; they hold meetings in the evening, rather than in the morning or in the afternoon, since experience has shown them that physical weariness is a favourable condition for the temporary and partial abolition of personal resistance. Adolf Hitler, in Mein Kampf, tells that at the beginning of his career as an orator he often held meetings on Sunday mornings, but that this experience taught him that it was impossible to create the necessary atmosphere of a mass-meeting in the early hours of the day.

This destructive propaganda is generally linked with political methods which cannot be classed as propaganda, because their aim is not consent but submission: for instance, the method which consists in threatening adversaries by terror. But, in theory, if not in practice, we may distinguish between the propagandist element of such methods and the

additional terroristic content.

The two extreme types of propaganda we have defined above, the conservative and the destructive, in practice are never found in their purest form. The worst demagogue is often obliged to discuss seriously with those who do not follow him, and to convince certain men or groups of men that their moral and material interests, as admitted by their personal hierarchy of values, is in conformance with his political action. On the other hand, even the most conservative politicians (conservative not only in their aims but also in their methods of propaganda) are sometimes obliged to use demagogy, to overcome some personal resistance of their listeners, or followers, and by lowering the personality's control through sentimental and affecting appeal, to make them adopt aims which are not those adopted by their personality. Sir Norman Angell is perhaps slightly exaggerating but surely not altogether wrong when he states that "assuredly he (the ordinary voter) is not trying to get prosperity, economic security, the abolition of unemployment. I think that when he stops to think he wants those things most. But normally unexamined impulses dictate his conduct and lead to the pursuit of contradictory ends. Very often in politics his more sober and more deliberate purpose is frustrated by other purposes which he does not so clearly recognize." 1

In order to avoid misunderstanding, we want to discriminate between "destructive" and "revolutionary" propaganda. It is possible, at least in principle, to make propaganda for revolutionary aims by conservative methods, by convincing a certain category of men, according to their personal and legitimate hopes and fears, their moral judgments, their economic group interest, their knowledge of social and political matters, that they have to join revolutionary organizations, and to struggle for a social transformation. Even when revolutionary propaganda attacks the values adopted by the individual personality, it is not

¹ Norman Angell, From Chaos to Control, London, 1933, pp. 100 sq.

necessarily merely destructive. In so far as it aims at creating in the individual a new moral and social conscience. a new hierarchy of values, it is even constructive, and its destroying action only prepares for the following positive action. The socialist propaganda in the nineteenth century has largely contributed to the destruction amongst industrial workers of a hierarchy of values and beliefs based upon the idea that the present social and economic organization was absolute and unchangeable, and that the only legitimate and useful way of obtaining conditions more in conformity with human dignity was the rise of the individual to a higher social position through assiduity, honesty, and economy. But at the same time it gave them another belief based upon the consciousness of their class-situation, the superiority of social aims as compared with merely individualistic aims, the idea that any individual has the right to claim human dignity—a system which, as a practical consequence, led to the idea of social revolution. This process is quite distinct from mere demagogy which, in order to overpower political competitors, destroys the personality without any attempt to reconstruct it on a new basis.

Generally, the adherents of democracy avoid merely destructive methods of propaganda, and this puts them in a situation of inferiority in comparison with their anti-democratic opponents. The destruction of the personality makes ineffective any propaganda which appeals to this personality, while the appeal to the consent of the person is unable to rebuild the personality once it has been destroyed. Thus, the problem of the defence of democracy against hostile propaganda is the problem of preventing destructive propaganda, or of paralysing its action.

What are the limits of anti-democratic propaganda in most democratic States? There are, of course, laws, rules, and customs, which prevent the worst excesses. The whole legislation and police control concerning the protection of youth, unfair competition, rights of authors, traffic in the

streets, the right of bill-posting, public morality, personal security, the protection of honour against libel and calumny, make the application of certain methods of propaganda difficult. Others which legally are not prohibited would encounter a strong resistance from a public of whom the majority would, for instance, refuse to listen to speakers, or to read papers, which express their ideas with coarseness

and obscenity.

Those limits are far from being effective against destructive propaganda. Firstly, the laws themselves and their application are not rigid enough entirely to prevent even those facts which they are especially destined to prevent. It is not as easy for a French writer to express his opinion about Italy in the words: "We spit upon her," as it is, for instance, for an Italian journalist writing about France. The French authorities, however, would hardly be able to suppress the publication of such an offence if some writer should find pleasure in such provocations in spite of the meagre sympathy he would find in the public. A paper containing obscene drawings of the kind preferred by the German paper Der Stürmer cannot be placarded in France or in England, as it is throughout the whole of Germany; but probably it could be printed if anyone wished to do so. Even adverse public opinion is not absolutely effective against propaganda of an extraordinarily low moral, æsthetic, and intellectual level, since there is everywhere a minority, especially amongst young people, who are either attracted by such a propaganda, which seems to them more expressive and bolder than the usual kind of political expression, or have themselves a personal standard completely in keeping with the lowest level of moral and other values.

Secondly, the destruction of the personality is possible by means which are neither criminal nor obscene—especially when the individual concerned has been unable, as a consequence of his education and experience, to build up a very strong, coherent, and resistant hierarchy of values, or has

been, during his lifetime, exposed to privations and violent passions which have weakened his system of appreciation and beliefs. This is possible by a method which consists in giving an immediate moral satisfaction and in promising for a more or less remote future a material satisfaction to certain desires of the individual, desires which are either suppressed or considered as unfair, desires such as those for personal power, for perverse or extravagant sexual satisfaction, for vengeance, for superiority over envied and therefore hated persons. This satisfaction is presented in an intimate connexion with other wants of an absolutely legitimate character, such as the desire for social justice, for a free development of national civilization, for economic progress, for peace, for freedom, for order. This connexion gives legitimacy to the immoral satisfaction and is therefore particularly attractive. The more sure the propagandist is of himself, the keener his attacks against tradition; the more free he is from respect for his enemies and for their ideas, the more eager is he for power; so much easier will it then be for him to dominate his audience, since all those elements constitute promises of an integral satisfaction of the desires prohibited by tradition, and which only a powerful person will be strong enough to convert into reality.

It would be easy, but it would lead us too far from our subject, to analyse, for instance, national-socialist propaganda under these aspects. Adolf Hitler's ideas concerning propaganda, as laid down in *Mein Kampf*, have often been quoted and expounded. His statements, generally, prove a very just observation, but most of the explanations he gives are too simple. He points out, for instance, that it is necessary to present all the adversaries of his ideas as one coherent group, since the mass would not understand that an idea which is true should be opposed by so many different inimical groups. It is true that the presentation of the different opponents as one set has a great chance of success, but for reasons much more complicated and subtle. The

belief that they are struggling alone, with a small number of friends, against an enemy of great strength who is mysterious and hides himself behind such different phenomena as organizations and political parties, but whom the eye of the trusted chief discovers in all his transformations, enables men to have the satisfaction of considering themselves as extraordinarily bold, clever, and powerful, as champions in the struggle for truth and right. This is the same attitude which, in its pathological form, appears in megalomania and in paranoia. Hitler also points out the advantage of showing that the adversary is wrong not only from time to time, but always. This shows the same tendency to create a primitive dualism, to divide civilization and its intellectual heritage into two camps, the one good, the other bad. In an observation of great psychological interest, the author of Mein Kampf states that the more monstrous the lie, the more chance it has of being believed. Once more, he explains the fact in a simple and rational way, saying that people will rather believe that a man has performed an inhuman crime than that the speaker has been able to invent such an imputation. It seems, however, that the success of such enormous lies is due to the fact that they make the listener appear perfect in his own critical eye, as compared with the man capable of such inhuman crimes; and further, he appears an important person in his struggle against such a monster; such a lie justifies also, by the adversary's profligacy, every arm used in the struggle against him; and lastly the idea of the monstrosity is very often even pleasant to the listener who finds in it the satisfaction-in phantasy at least-of suppressed desires which drive him to do the same things or others equally monstrous, but which their anti-social and perverse character banishes from normal people's knowledge and consciousness. A method promising great success is the one which allows people to take vengeance against those who have inspired in them envy and a feeling of inferiority. Anti-Jewish propaganda is largely based

upon this fact. In socialist and communist propaganda there is also a tendency to exploit the worker's inferioritycomplex in order to stir up his hatred against the capitalist society. Hendrik de Man, in his studies of the psychology of socialism, has pointed out the importance of such feelings in the growth of the worker's socialist ideology. A more dangerous and, from the point of view of the conservation of social morality, intolerable kind of propaganda is the exploitation of suppressed sexual desires. In the German anti-semitic propaganda, especially in the paper Der Stürmer, accusations against Jews of committing sexual crimes, such as violation, seduction of minors, perversity, are very frequent, and the verbal accusation is often accompanied by To young people and sometimes also to adults illustrations. this gives an opportunity of occupying their mind in a legitimate fashion with sexual phantasies, and the pleasure which follows makes the political idea presented in this way attractive to them. At the same time, the conscience, or the feeling of the practical impossibility of this kind of sexual satisfaction, creates hatred-psycho-analysts would say: a drive of aggression-which can be easily directed against the objects of this propaganda, e.g. the Jews.

Such a propaganda can hardly be prevented by the laws existing in most democracies, even when the most extraordinary abuses are effectively prohibited. Generally, the aggressive anti-democratic propaganda is linked with terroristic methods, physical attacks against adversaries, dreadful punishment of "betrayers," destruction of the party centres, placards, and newspapers of the opponents. The freedom, granted in any democracy to the expression of ideas and the right of free association—the freedom of the press, the particular privileges in favour of the members of parliament and of other constitutional corporations, the fear of responsible ministers of being accused of favouring their own party in an anti-constitutional way, make any attempt to suppress such an agitation of combined destructive propaganda and

terror ineffective. When in normal periods the solidity of tradition and civilization prevents the citizens from letting themselves be overpowered by the attacks against their personality, in periods of economic or political crisis, in which the misery, the insecurity, the danger of war or revolution bring about very strong emotions and lower the standard of civilization, the chances of anti-democratic propaganda are particularly great, and the very existence of democracy is imperilled. This danger becomes irresistible when propaganda and terrorism are secretly supported by foreign governments against whose influence the police are almost powerless, or when a foreign power directly, by the use of its diplomatic and military influence, obliges a democratic

government to tolerate fascist propaganda.

In situations such as these, the existence of democracy depends on its ability to save itself by the means which governments have received from the hands of the free constitutions. It may be necessary to dissolve a political party, to prohibit meetings, to take measures which are in contradiction to democratic traditions, and, once the political tension has reached a very high degree, even measures incompatible with the constitution. Some defenders of democracy, e.g. Professor Mirkine-Guétzevitch, in order to justify such an unconstitutional suppression of a fascist movement, put forward that it is the right of a democratic government to violate the letter of the constitution if this is the only means by which the spirit of democracy may be saved. Such an argument is, of course, inacceptable to those who think that the particular feature of democracy, besides the principle of representation, is the perfect freedom of speaking and writing, the habeas corpus, and the equality of rights granted to all citizens, principles which are violated by the unilateral suppression of one party's propaganda. Others, such as Professor Harold Laski, claim that civic liberty is essential to democracy and that whosoever abolishes it gives up democracy. Indeed, it is hard to give a definition

of the spirit of democracy if this spirit is to subsist even when the institution in which it finds its practical expression are partly abolished.

It is the more difficult to oppose the spirit of democracy to the "letter of the constitution" as, under certain circumstances, democratic governments may be obliged in their struggle against fascism to abolish, for a part of the population, all the political rights and the guarantees of habeas corpus, with the result that neither freedom nor equality is granted. In this case, it is not the spirit of democracy which is saved, but only some of the democratic principles, while the others are given up. A new problem arises, and instead of asking: "Can democracy be saved, and how can it be saved?" we put forward the question: "What maximum of democratic principles can be saved when anti-democratic propaganda has reached such a strength that the totality of democratic principles can certainly not be saved?"

It appears that a government which deprives its antidemocratic opponents of the right of propaganda and of all the rights which enable them to make propaganda—such as the freedom of speech, of writing, of holding meetings, of parliamentary immunity, and even of habeas corpus¹—is able to save two of the fundamental democratic principles: the principle of the majority's consent to the government's policy, and the principle of the protection of the citizen against violence. This last principle does not exclude the use of violence against those who try to terrorize other citizens.

It is not possible to give examples proving that such a policy can really save the two principles mentioned above. In the States that have given up the other principles of democracy, dictatorial institutions have followed. One example, however, may illustrate our thesis; that of Austria—not the Austrian democracy instituted in 1918, nor the

¹ Of course instituting these repressions before the hostile propaganda has destroyed the inner resistance of a very considerable part of the population.

semi-totalitarian system which existed for five years, but the half-democratic and free Austrian State that lived just twenty-four hours, from the evening of March 10th to the evening of March 11th, 1938. It is obvious that a State exposed to the pressure of a military power like Germany, threatened by an anti-democratic movement which has the complete support of a strong foreign power, suffering for twenty years from a structural economic crisis, can hardly save all the democratic principles. It is also obvious that the system installed by Chancellor Dollfuss was not an attempt to save some democratic principles by giving up the others. But Chancellor Schuschnigg tried-first without success—to get some popular support by granting a certain amount of freedom. So, for instance, the Austrian government granted, in 1936, the free election of "Betriebsräte" (workers' delegates) in all factories, and these representatives, elected in a free and secret ballot, had the confidence of their voters.

In February and March 1938, under the immediate threat of German invasion, Schuschnigg started negotiations with the illegal organizations which had the confidence of the working class, such as the Free Unions, the Revolutionary Socialists, and the Communists. As the result of these negotiations, on the 10th March 1938 a meeting of workers' delegates was held in the Arbeiterheim in Florisdorf, and decided to give the complete support of the working class to the government in its struggle for Austria's independence. The government, whose State-Secretary for Labour was the socialist Watzek, granted to the followers of left-wing delegates the freedom to reconstitute some of their organizations dissolved in 1934. So it is very probable that at this moment the majority of the Austrian population was in favour of the government, and the rapid military intervention of Germany in order to prevent a plebiscite seems to prove that this was also the opinion of the Reich government. The Austrian government also took some measures

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which can be defined as aiming at the protection of personality against violence; such a measure was a general amnesty for political prisoners. And the whole governmental action destined to prevent a national-socialist government in Austria, the imprisonment of many thousands of persons in concentration-camps, the persecution of Jews, the diminution of religious freedom, was an act of protection against the suppression of personalities.

We have considered the Austrian situation as an example proving that it is possible to save certain democratic principles by giving up others. The fact that twenty-four hours later the democratic principles saved by Schuschnigg were also given up cannot be opposed to our conclusion, since the invasion of Austria by 100,000 foreign soldiers is an event no more dependent on the amount of freedom existing in

this State, than an earthquake, or an epidemic.

The protection of two democratic principles by the abolition of all other principles is, from a juridical viewpoint, justified if the State is acting in self-defence. To a democracy threatened only by destructive propaganda but not by an immediate attack (war, or revolution), the right of self-defence can hardly be granted. Considering, however, the extraordinary situation with which such a State is faced, it may invoke the special right, arising from a case of urgency, in which it is legitimate to sacrifice the minor to save the major good. So it is interesting from the legal as well as from the sociological point of view to ask whether the two principles of the consent of the majority, and of the protection of personality, are superior to other democratic principles, such as the principles of equality of rights, freedom of speech and writing, the habeas corpus, and parliamentary representation.

Historical consideration shows that democratic institutions have always been the result of a struggle between an executive power more or less independent of the consent of the citizens—though often supported by them, as for instance the French

Monarchy in the late eighteenth century—and a rising social group which either represents the majority of population, or hopes to get the majority's support when in a position to apply for it. From 1215 to 1688, the English Parliament fought for privileges destined to increase its power and to diminish the King's. In the nineteenth century, popular movements struggled for a share of the power held by Parliament, which then controlled legislative as well as executive power, and which, by its composition, had become independent of the consent of the people's majority. All the institutions which are the result of this struggle are destined to assure that the government shall depend on the consent of the majority. The same tendency is made clear when we consider the struggle of the National Assembly in France, or, more exactly, the Third Estate, against the Monarchy's absolute power and against the privileges of the Nobility and Clergy. The leaders of the Third Estate considered themselves as the representatives of the people, as was pointed out by Sieyès and Mirabeau. Their aim was a constitution granting to the People (which somewhat later will be called the Nation, i.e. practically the majority) the complete control of government. Such principles as the division of legislative and executive power, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and so on, were means to prevent governmental abuse which might diminish the power of the Peuple Souverain.

The second object of democratic institutions is the protection of the individual. Though the claim for this protection, at first, was just a means of diminishing the executive power, it was considered at the same time as an end in itself. The Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, for instance, declares that certain personal rights are absolute and independent of legislation. These rights are not what we should call to-day democratic liberties, since the most important right which modern democracy grants to the citizen, the right of free association, of forming unions, parties, organiza-

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tions, is strictly excluded. These personal rights are defined in opposition to the arbitrary power of the absolute State. The idea that even a government based upon popular consent may violate the sacred rights of man and citizen is not considered as possible. Nevertheless, the declaration is so strict that, according to it, no government, whatever may be its legal position, is allowed to override the *Droits de l'Homme*. In modern constitutions, the protection of individuals against arbitrary intervention of the State is defined in a way which proves that no government is allowed to abolish those privileges of the citizens except in case of defence.

So it is obvious, from a sociological and from a historical point of view, that, with the principle of the dependency of the government on the majority's consent, the principle of personal defence against violence is a primary thesis from which the other democratic principles are derived. Now, however, we are faced with the further question whether the defence of the individual against violence and abuse can be considered as granted when most constitutional liberties are abandoned.

In order to answer this question, we have to distinguish between two conceptions of the individual which are entirely different. Following the first one, which we may call the Liberal Conception, the individual is a being endowed with needs and with desires, independent of his fellows, a being permanently in search of certain satisfactions, who considers all the things and events which favour those satisfactions as his "interest," and uses his intelligence as a means to discover what are his interests, and by what methods he may bring about events and situations in conformity with these interests. The fact of living in a society together with other individuals obliges each one to observe certain rules in order to prevent a general conflagration of interests. The political behaviour of the individual is a part of his search for the satisfaction of his interests. Propaganda is one of the

various ways to show the individual what are his interests and what are the means that grant satisfaction to his desires. To prohibit propaganda is to prevent individuals from being taught, and from teaching their fellows, how to search for their rights. The second conception, which, for the present, we refrain from calling by a particular name, is opposed to the liberal one. It considers the individual as a socialized being, living and existing only in society, striving after ends which are not the expression of isolated needs and desires but of a personal and social ideal. What constitutes the human individual is the fact that he is a personality, that he possesses a hierarchy of values-moral, intellectual, æsthetic, economic, religious and other values. What an individual considers as his interest is the satisfaction of his desires according to this system of values, on a certain level of civilization. The political opinions and actions of the individual are to be understood as an attempt to bring about a social organization which is in conformity with the personality. Any propaganda which tries to bring about a political behaviour according to primitive, anarchic desires, by lowering the social and moral standard of the individual, by destroying his personality, is an attack on personal freedom, and the suppression of such a propaganda is an act of personal defence. Destructive propaganda is as much directed against the individual as a dictatorial and terroristic government which obliges the citizens to give up some of the values which are a constituent part of their personality, and to accept others which are incompatible with their personal moral standard.

In so far as this question is a philosophical one, it is not in the sociologist's competence to decide between the two opposed conceptions. The philosophical discussion is not much advanced, and in particular the second conception has not been frequently applied. Many contributors to the study of these questions are to be found in the French review Esprit, the organ of the "personalist" movement, which opposes

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the "person" to the "individual"—individual as considered by the liberal conception. It must, however, be pointed out that the definition of the "person," in many points, is different

from our conception of "personality."

From the point of view of sociology, we have to state that the liberal conception, as set forth above, has been proved false. Neither in economic, nor in political, nor in any other kind of behaviour, does the individual follow exclusively his personal and isolated interests. On the contrary, he generally becomes aware of what he considers as his interest only when he has joined a group or a movement, or has been influenced by it. The determination by rational consideration, by comparison of interests and calculation, is less important than the influence of immediate approval or disapproval, of sympathy and antipathy, of feelings, of beliefs. Even the integral personality, which has not been undermined by destructive propaganda or strong emotions, rarely takes up a position towards social problems in a merely rational way, but follows direct impulses. What distinguishes these impulses from the primitive, mechanical, immoral behaviour of individuals behaving under the influence of destructive propaganda is that the integrate personality never loses the control of its actions, and that it conserves the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic level which it has attained.

We have considered the defence of democracy by the suppression of anti-democratic and destructive propaganda and by the abandonment of a part of the democratic principles. Before a democratic government uses such a dangerous weapon, the adherents of democracy try to oppose the propaganda of their enemies by their own propaganda. It has often been said that such democratic anti-propaganda is doomed to be ineffective since the arguments put forward by the followers of dictatorship, and their lack of scruple, provides them with too great an advantage in the competition. We want to investigate this problem, and put the following question: by what means, and with what chance of success,

can democracy hope to oppose its own propaganda to that of its enemies?

In any democratic group we find a tendency to make certain concessions to anti-democratic propaganda. democrats hope that people who want to have what totalitarian parties promise them, but who also want to keep the advantages of democracy, will rather follow those democrats who promise to give them a part of what they expect to get from the enemies of democracy. Such a consideration is a consequence of the liberal conception of the individual. If the citizen, in politics, were to expect the realization of a certain number of interests from which, complete satisfaction of all desires not being possible, he may choose the greatest, then, of course, the tactics of concessions would be right. Now, the propaganda made against democracy does not consist in a definite number of promises, but in an attempt to destroy the personality with its hierarchy of values since these values link the individual to democracy. If those who defend democracy seem themselves influenced by destructive propaganda, if they give up the slightest part of the specific values by which democracy is distinguished from dictatorship, if they point out that a part of the anti-democratic propaganda is justified, then they themselves contribute immediately to the destruction of personality and so create the condition of democracy's defeat. The duty of democratic propaganda is to save the personality from destruction, but not to make the democratic parties more attractive by lowering their own moral level. Those who are in favour of concessions made by democrats to hostile propaganda, e.g. to antisemitic slogans, forget that, once the personality is destroyed-no matter whether by democratic or by antidemocratic propaganda-there is no reason at all why an individual should any longer be in favour of the democratic system whose main advantage is its conformity to a higher personal standard.

Another method, based upon a psychological error no less

dangerous than the one which leads democrats to compromise with Fascism, consists in answering destructive antidemocratic propaganda by a positively democratic, but equally destructive propaganda. The effect of such a propaganda is not favourable to democracy, and this for two reasons. Firstly, the destruction of personality, even when followed by an attempt to link the individual to democracy, diminishes the citizen's readiness and ability to criticize and to think, and makes him willing to accept the guidance of a more or less superior individual. Thus, it prepares dictatorship and totalitarianism, whose great advantage is to spare individuals the effort of thinking, of searching for truth, of relying on their own responsibility. The second fact that makes this method so dangerous is the superiority in demagogy granted to anti-democratic movements by their merely critical and negative position, while democrats have to defend not the present government nor each letter of the present constitution-but the moral standard on which democracy is based.

So there is but one method which conforms to the wants of democracy, and that is positive propaganda in favour of democratic values, propaganda aiming at strengthening, and not at weakening or at destroying the personality. Such a propaganda urges, of course, a real belief in democratic values, and the total negation of the values put forward by totalitarian movements. It is incompatible with any compromise with the adversary's ideas, with any concessions. The more democrats are aware of their own moral superiority, of the higher personal and social standard which they are defending, the more they are capable of giving their followers an example of this standard, the more will their propaganda help the individual to save his personality from destruction. Whether the effect of such a propaganda is great or small, it has, at any rate, a positive effect in favour of democracy, while the effect of the other methods, whether it be strong or weak, is an effect in favour of anti-democratic movements and ideas.

In practice, democratic propaganda is rarely as effective as anti-democratic. In those countries where the success of democratic parties is yet greater than the advance of their adversaries, this superiority of the democrats is due to other causes than to propaganda. Amongst the circumstances which favour the propaganda of the enemies of democracy, one of the most important is probably the financial support they get from those social circles which possess the greatest economic power, and, in many countries, from foreign governments. But democrats also have large support, or, at any rate, could easily have it. It seems that they not only neglect the importance of propaganda but even are influenced by a prejudice against it, an opinion that propaganda is immoral, anti-democratic, and dangerous. This belief results from a confusion between propaganda and the destructive action of certain kinds of propaganda. As the previous considerations have shown, propaganda is the specific democratic means of forming public opinion in so far as it asks for consent. The adherents of what may be called "sociological morality," i.e. the ideal of directing society by the conscious action of men-an ideal accepted by most democrats-should be the first to understand the importance of propaganda and its perfectly moral character.1

There is another obstacle which makes democratic propaganda often ineffective, and sometimes even impossible, that is the resistance of certain supporters of democratic parties to anti-fascist propaganda. A part of the bourgeoisie, in every country, even when opposed to fascism and ready to tolerate the destruction of anti-democratic organizations, are afraid of destroying the anti-democratic ideology. The existence of an ideological current against democracy seems to them a weapon against socialism and communism, a permanent threat by which left-wing movements may be intimidated. There is also an obvious anxiety that followers

¹ The Author has developed the idea in a paper to which reference should be made: J. Klanser, "Propagande et Morale," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, 1939.

of fascism, when convinced that their ideal is wrong, may turn to socialism or communism. This diversion of the most powerful supporters of democracy is a very important, if not the most important, factor in favour of anti-democratic propaganda. But those considerations concern not so much the question of propaganda as the whole problem of the social and political structure of modern democracy.

BOOK REVIEWS

AFRICAN WOMEN: A Study of the Ibo of Nigeria. By Sylvia Leith-Ross. Faber & Faber. 15s. net.

This book is the product of a year's study of the Ibo tribe which Mrs. Leith-Ross undertook with the aid of a Leverhulme Fellowship in 1934, after much previous experience of the country and peoples of Nigeria, both as the wife of a Government official, and later as an adviser on women's education attached to the Education Department. The Ibo are one of the most interesting tribes on the West coast of Africa, both from an ethnological and from an administrative point of view—a "vigorous, ambitious, avid, and numerous race" as the author describes them—and evidently racing helter-skelter down the path of European

civilization, in love with the future, and not with the past.

Mrs. Leith-Ross deals with one aspect of their culture only—the women's life, thought, and social groups, and most of all, the adaptation they have made to European culture. The Aba riots of 1930, organized solely by the Ibo women, made them famous in the history of colonial administration, and the present author adds some vivid pictures of their independence, their control of trading relations, their ambition, their enthusiastic adoption of European business openings, and the smatterings of English education they are gulping down whole. She does this by means of a series of sketches of Ibo women in different stages of reaction to Western civilization—" primitive" or purely farming; "sophisticated and primitive," or "farming and trading"; "transition"; and "sophisticated," or urban women mostly living at Port Harcourt. This is a device which is being used increasingly in descriptions of culture contacts and is here employed with success. Mrs. Leith-Ross's comments on the effects of Western civilization on the Ibo are sane and illuminating, and give one violently to think. African Women gives the impression of a primitive tribe put aboard a powerful new machine and set full tilt down a slope while the white man watches with a kind of terror at his handiwork, not knowing how to jam on the brake or whether, in fact, he wants the progress stopped.

Mrs. Leith-Ross writes with vivid charm and humour, and her descriptive accounts of native court procedure, church services in the bush, or interviews with individual natives stimulate constantly. Her conclusions, particularly as to the education and educability of the African woman will no doubt act as a challenge to administrators and missionaries in this particularly difficult area, and I know of no more balanced or sympathetic account of the pros and cons of Mission education than is

contained in the last chapters of the book.

From the sociological point of view there are two experiments of interest made in this book: first the attempt to describe a primitive culture entirely from the point of view of its women and with the use of women informants; and secondly, to describe present ambitions and "culture patterns" with no reference to those of the past. As regards

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this purely feminine approach, one is grateful that Mrs. Leith-Ross has exploded once and for all the fallacy of the "primitive woman," the characterless beast of burden, fast bound by traditional chains. The Ibo women strike her as more "modern" and go-ahead than the men. But it is doubtful whether comparisons of the type she often makes are admissible without a more detailed sociological analysis than she has given. In each type of society described the author gives short notes on the domestic grouping, the economic occupations of the people, the women's attitude to marriage, and any rites or beliefs which she came across. But the material is given in the form of a diary and without any clear description, however summary, of the social structure of the tribe, the composition of family, kinship group or town, and all the complex reciprocal relationships on which economic and political life must depend. To fill this gap would obviously mean an excursion into the world of the men, but without it we are constantly held up for want of the necessary sociological data on which to judge Mrs. Leith-Ross's material. It seems to me impossible, for instance, to describe a people's attitude to marriage, sex, and procreation—an important part of the book—without an analysis of the whole institution of marriage, laws of descent, legal obligations observed by husband and wife and by their kinsmen, the different functions of the family, educational ideals, and many other legal, political, and religious aspects. In short, I do not believe it to be possible to study the women's side of life so completely apart from that of the men unless an outline study of the tribe has already been made, nor do I believe that a description of the "individual Ibo woman" can be made significant as a basis of African-European comparisons without a fuller description of the "culture pattern" of the society at large. Similarly, it is hard to estimate the degree of change in institutions without some account of the social organization of the people previous to the change. Are the Ibo so completely detached from their past as this work implies?

But the experiment is a courageous and an interesting one, and merely stresses once again the great difficulty of the modern anthropologist. How is he to make the detailed sociological analysis of particular aspects of culture which his training now fits him to undertake without a preliminary outline of the culture which will describe the integration of the society as a whole? And how is he to live long enough to do both? Thus Mrs. Leith-Ross raises important methodological questions in her book.

A. I. RICHARDS.

ÜBER DEN PROZESS DER ZIVILISATION. Vol. II. By Norbert Elias. 1939. Haus zum Falken, Bâle.

The first volume of this important study has been reviewed in these pages in 1938. Elias's second volume falls into two sections. The first and larger one deals with the history and sociological theory of the centralized state and its emergence. The smaller second section, entirely theoretical, combines the results of the first section of volume II with the results of volume I, which mainly dealt with the history of manners.

BOOK REVIEWS

In this final section the dependency of the development of refined manners upon the emergence of a centralized state out of feudal anarchy is made

apparent.

In volume I Elias, to a large extent, moved on untrodden ground, and the history of manners in Western civilization, as he presented it there, must be regarded as an important factual contribution to the history of modern civilization, quite apart from its more theoretical implications. The history of the modern state, which forms the main subject of volume II, is better known, and the historian will therefore find that the facts submitted by Elias in this part of his study have mostly been known before. Yet, while it would be very difficult to say anything substantially new about a subject so thoroughly investigated as the emergence of French absolutism, there are to be found in Elias's presentation of this well-known development certain theoretical generalizations which will attract attention. Among these, the connexion he establishes between the growth of population and the development of new political forms seems to be of particular importance. At bottom, according to Elias, centralized administration is an inevitable result of the growing complexity of social ties which limit the independence of the individual and which, in their turn, are a result of the growth of population as such.

It is from this assumption, which, in itself, is convincing enough, that the conclusions of the final section of the book are drawn. The transition from the wildness of the early Middle Ages to the refinement of the late eighteenth century, Elias maintains, is, in the main, due to this growing dependency of the individual, especially the individual of the ruling classes, upon his social equals and superiors. The paramount power which rises above the individual lords is essentially an agent of this development; its social function is to see to it that the social fabric in its growing complexity is working. It enforces certain rules of mutual respect, suppresses the rule of force, and, by so doing, ultimately brings about the habit of self-control as against the direct use of physical force which was characteristical of the Middle Ages. Thus, through social pressure, emerges what psycho-analysts describe as the "super-ego" in the individual. All self-control, Elias concludes, has originally been controlled

from outside, which has been assimilated by the individual.

I do not think that anybody will quarrel with the formula contained in this last sentence. Nor can there be much doubt that the growing complexity of social life, and the emergence of a powerful police controlling the impulses of the individual, have played a considerable rôle in the emergence of those habits of rigid self-control which are so characteristical of our own, as of every ageing civilization. It will be Elias's lasting merit to have established this connexion. In one short formula, a "polite" society, according to the author, is always a "policed" society. There can be little doubt of the correctness of this view.

There is only one proviso to be added, and it is this, that the policing of society cannot by any means be regarded as the most important element in the formation of the individual super-ego, as Elias seems to believe.

He himself occasionally notes the fact that feudalism, far from being simply an age of unbridled licence, is characterized by badly controlled alternations between wild outbreaks of passion and equally wild outbreaks of the sense of guilt. But his theory fails to account for the fact. This obviously does not invalidate his conclusions, but gives an indication of the limits of their validity. What he describes is not the mechanism forming the super-ego, but one of the mechanisms modifying its form, and not necessarily the most important one. It is noteworthy, in this context, that in Elias's presentation of the emergence of self-control the influence of Christianity is hardly mentioned at all, except as a power supporting the king against the feudal barons. It is equally remarkable that the emergence of an entirely new conception of love, as embodied in the Troubadours, appears to Elias as mainly due to the social subordination of poor knights to the wives of powerful noblemen—a situation which may have played a third-rate part in the emergence of "Minnesang" but certainly cannot account for the emergence of the concept of spiritual love, which, obviously, originated with Plato, was adopted by Christianity and infused into the feudal society of the Middle Ages as soon as this society became more thoroughly christianized. And a theory of the superego which cannot adequately account for the transformation of sexual life is obviously incomplete.

Speaking more generally, the connexion between "police" and " politeness " does not seem to account for the concrete content of what is regarded as "polite behaviour." It is true that a king can demand from his courtiers a type of deference which the feudal lord of the Middle Ages owed to nobody. But why this deference should take the form of certain inhibitions in the matter of sneezing, spitting, and other similar types of behaviour is not altogether obvious. How little obvious it is becomes apparent through the wide divergence of manners in various civilizations. At the court of Louis XIV it would have been outrageous to eat with one's fingers. But it was not so at the court of Saladin. And there is no explanation for the difference between the two. Elias's theory, on the whole, accounts best for the strict taboos upon the use of violence and upon everything apt to allude to violence; his sociological theory of the development of the use of the knife at table is quite remarkable. To put it into psycho-analytic terms, his theory seems to be best adapted to the changes in the sphere of aggression, but its validity seems to diminish where aggression plays a smaller part and becomes almost nil where the morals and manners of sex life are concerned. Yet it is a matter of great importance that at least one out of several mechanisms which govern "the process of civilization" should for once have been studied from a theoretical angle and illustrated with a rich wealth of

material.

FRANZ BORKENAU.

